New Russian Stalin

In recent decades, especially since the Orange Revolution, Russian media, politicians, political scientists, and, in fact, the Kremlin ideological machine at large has never stopped criticizing Ukrainian textbooks – for a lack of academic content and international tolerance, for xenophobia and anti-Russian tones. Sometimes, even with the apologists of fascism, nationalism, and other unpardonable – in the opinion of Russian politics – items. Responses to the aforementioned accusations were published already in ZN and other Ukrainian media. But there are still questions: Is everything OK with Russian historical didactics? Are Russian textbooks in accordance with history and truth, as well as standards for proper respect to values and the historical memory of neighboring states and people? And are Russian history books deprived of xenophobia and elements of Russian nationalism? We will attempt to answer these questions in this article.

On December 9-12, 2007, Paris hosted the international colloquium “Paroxysms of the Great Stalin Terror. 1937-1938” organized jointly by the National Institute for Demographic Studies, the Institute for Political Studies (Paris, France) and the city of Paris. Its participants were leading specialists on the Great Terror of 1937-1938 from Russia, Ukraine, France, Germany, and the USA. The opening of the forum took place in Luxembourg Palace and was chaired by well-regarded French historian, Professor Mark Ferro.

A. Raginsky, head of Memorial, Moscow Chapter, fine-tuned the discussion when he emphasized in his presentation the importance of exploring the phenomenon of historical memory and making public the results of Great Terror studies. These issues become especially important due to trends observed in today’s Russia, namely systemic efforts “to construct and reconstruct the happy past” in education. Within the framework of this doctrine, new “white spots” are being formed, the trend being supported by the practice of eliminating facts that do not match the image of “the happy past” or are “embarrassing” and difficult to interpret. As a result, research topics are narrowed; archives closed, etc…. A. Raginsky characterized the contemporary interpretation of Stalin’s policy as “yes, but nevertheless…”: “Yes, many peasants died or were oppressed during collectivization, but nevertheless, the agricultural sector was modernized and industrialized; yes, industrialization was achieved with the use of force and at the expense of the rural population, but nevertheless over a short period the developed and industrialized USSR emerged instead of an agrarian Russia; yes, Stalin organized mass repression, but he won the war …”

There are grounds to believe that the trend discussed during the conference moved from academic circles into practical life. Media is packed with materials dedicated to the adoption of a conceptual framework for the course “History of Russia 1900-1945” developed by the team of authors under the guidance of A. Danilov, a doctorate in history, Chair of Russian History ХХ Century-beginning of ХХІ Century at the Moscow State University, as well as the preparation of new textbooks on Russian history based on the aforementioned conceptual framework. Its text can be found online at: http//prosv.ru. According to its authors, the conceptual framework, and accordingly, textbooks on the history of Russia from 1900 to 1945, are rooted in the “principles and methodological approaches characteristic of the textbook “History of Russia 1945-2007” (a highly praised textbook by A. Filippov, A. Danilov and A. Rybkin “A New History of Russia 1945-2007” and also the Teacher’s Book attached to this textbook — Comment by the authors).

What is the main principle chosen by the authors as the cornerstone for the new (and I hardly restrain myself from saying “concise”) course on the history of Russia for the 20^th-21^st century for high school? It is articulated in the Teacher’s Book by A. Filippov (A.V. Filippov. A New History of Russia. 1945-2006.: Teacher’s Book. - M: Prosveshcheniye, 2007). It reads, "The major objective of the new course is to establish conditions allowing students to develop their own outlook - a civic position that is rooted in the natural aspiration to develop all abilities and capacities in order to increase one’s own competitiveness in society and our Motherland’s competitiveness in the modern world." (p. 7).

Noteworthy, the conceptual framework for the new history of Russia in the second half of the 20^th century was developed after the teacher’s book by A. Filippov was published; the book in fact fulfills the mission of the conceptual framework by A. Danilov and his team: it includes guidelines and tips for future textbook authors and school teachers. Following the advice of these esteemed gentlemen, a whole series of new textbooks on modern Russian history has been published, which authors describe as “broad historical facts and drawm from different sources, including new ones”. These, for instance, are textbooks for the 11^th grade by A.F. Kisilev, V.P. Popov. History of Russia. ХХ Century to beginning of the ХХІ Century (Moscow: Drofa Publisher, 2007); by the way, this textbook was awarded the title of the best Russian book and received the award “Great Book”; by A. Levandovsky, S. Mironenko, Yu. Shchetinin. Russian History ХХ Century to beginning of the ХХІ Century: Textbook for 11^th grade general secondary educational establishments (M: Prosveshcheniye, 2007).

Probably, it is time to make a short commentary for the Ukrainian reader who knows about the domestic practice of writing textbooks from numerous publications is press (that appear in a wavelike manner, usually around September 1^st or the end of school / university entrance exams), and is unaware of the process in Russia.

Unlike our authors, Russian educators and authors have until now not followed only one, common for the whole country, curriculum approved by the government – they were guided by a state standard, which was the basis for developing local curricula and textbooks. The conceptual framework is expected to play the role of mandatory guidelines, like the ill-fated aphorism “there is an opinion”: there is no direct order, but who would dare to ignore the opinion?”

As stated by the authors, the methodological basis for the conceptual framework is comprised of “the newest findings of Russian historians that emphasize the evaluation of our history in accordance with the objectives of protecting and strengthening our state sovereignty, rearing citizens who are patriots of Russia”. In this context, special attention is paid to the definition of the essence of Russia’s national interests, not only in relation to internal processes, but in connection with international challenges faced by the country over the analyzed period. As we see, Russian scholars are not embarrassed to recommend their Ukrainian colleagues focus in their textbooks about patriotism as the main aspect in upbringing. And Russian journalists have nothing against it. They also have no reservations against the following statement: “The major focus of students should be the explanation of the motives and rationale of authorities” and then again “We believe it is important to demonstrate the logic and direction of changes in external policy on the eve and during the first stage of the second world war” (we have preserved the orthography of the quoted source - Authors.).

It is worth looking into this conceptual framework as it concerns the current Russian vision of the history of Russia – the history of the USSR during the first half of the 20^th century. The authors do not cover all benchmarks in Russian history; they only dwell upon those events that require reinterpretation.

The authors made a breakthrough in putting an end to denying the essential link between the Russian Empire under the Romanov family and the Soviet Union as the successor of Russian imperial policy. Not afraid any more of accusations in “bourgeois falsifications of history”, the authors stated: “One of the objectives of the textbook should be the elimination of the artificial demarcation line between the prerevolutionary and postrevolutionary history of Russia, the demonstration of consistency and succession of its historic route.” Quite interestingly, Soviet history criticized M. Hrushevky and Ukrainian historians for over fifty years for such consistency and succession, calling the latter “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists”, and in 1930-1950s labelling them “fascists” and “enemies of the people.”

Generally speaking, the authors of the conceptual framework are proposing to contrast Russia and Europe, bringing them close to the 20^th century position of Eurasian philosophers, starting with N. Danilevsky and up to A. Dugin, and incorporating, in fact, Marxism-Leninism as a Eurasian communistic trend, distinguishing specific Orthodox civilization as opposing the “evil influence of the West” or sticking to the special mission of Soviet Orthodox Marxism, namely: to oppose opportunistic European socialism and all forms of “Euro-communism”. Hence, the unexpectedly negative attitude toward the ruin of rural communities and negative assessment of P. Stolypin reforms. In clashes between the “West” and “Anti-West”, which is the essence of societal processes from the 19^th century to the beginning of the 20^th century, authors openly support the latter, calling Marxism “a radical form of Westernism”.

As in the times of the Moscow kingdom and Petersburg empire, authors believed in the special mission performed by Russia in the ХІV-ХІХ centuries. This special mission remains equally important in the ХХ, and also in the ХХІ century. The reader is expected to conclude that Russian history cannot be measured by civilized Europe or the Western world. And this in fact acknowledges the existence of two – or many – historical truths. What is good and a plus from the point of view of Europe and North America, is not good for the Russian people and, rather, is a minus. After all, it is the right of any state to build its future through reconstructing the past; whether Russia wants to associate more with Asia – no problem. But then, why should it forbid Ukraine – who at the threshold of several civilizations, wants to associate itself with the European and not Russian legacy – to have an independent vision of its history?

By the way, Ukraine is mentioned in the conceptual framework only once: in connection with the famine of 1933. And this is considering that the Bolshevist and white guard of Russia orchestrated the event against Ukraine during 1917-1920s; in the 1920-1930s exercised the unprecedented mass repression of peasants and intellectuals; joined Western Ukraine in 1939 and organized purging operations against its national liberation movement. The latter term is not mentioned in the concept at all; instead, the word “aliens” is used – an expression well-known from tsarist times. This taciturn attitude can only be explained as the intention to preserve a cloudy mist and retain “clean white spots”, hiding embarrassing questions like an ostrich. Ukraine, as a subject of history, does not exist for Russian educators, and for Russians at large. It is only part of the new empire built by Bolsheviks on the ruins of the Romanov Empire. Ukraine, like the Baltic states and Bessaribia (now Moldova), is only part of the motherland that once was part of “our state”.

Special attention should be paid to external policy. Here, we were surprised by many changes. The Entente bloc and Russia’s participation in it is assessed very negatively. The Triple Entente is not an “ally”, but an “accomplice”, according to the authors. But Germany of the First World War and up to the Second World War received a lot of praise. The authors do not like the fact that England, France and the USA were exporters of western democracy, which Russians were not ready to accept. Here, Mr. Danilov makes a chronological leap into the Stalin era and praises him for the introduction of the Iron Curtain, asserting in a rather doubtful “Russian-style doctrine” that “Soviet isolationism was a fully rational and useful phenomenon”. Following the tradition of “good Soviet times,” Russia is not one of the instigators of the First World War, it was innocent. It was England and other Entente members who pursued the goal of invasion. Russia was not among aggressors or conquerors (!). But then, what about the maniac desire of its top leaders to conquer the Bosporus and Dardanelles passages, which was a dream even for a prominent pro-European politician and tsarist opponent P. Miliukov, Kadet Party leader? At that time, the Russian elite, poisoned by the idea “Moscow is the third Rome,” looked at the Balkans and Middle East as “the Russian Motherland,” confident that Russia has more rights to that lands than Greece or Turkey. And the willingness to adjoin Galicia in order to put an end to “Ukrainian heresy” – isn’t it an aggressive, militaristic and belligerent intention? In this case, where is the elementary historical and academic truth?

Authors of the conceptual framework boosted espionage-mania. They accuse the intelligence community of European states, special service units of the Entente and the Fourth Union of the military of defeating Russia and the collapse of the tsarist army. Germany funded and supported Lenin and supplied him with a protected railway wagon; England gave a warship to bring G. Plehanov home. The coincidence with the concise history of the Bolshevik Communist Party (VKP(b)) is evident. But even Marxism-Leninism acknowledged the fall of the Russian Empire as a legitimate and justified phenomenon, charactering the former as “the prison of the people”.

The special mission of Russia can be traced in Russia’s foreign policy. The authors justify the aggressive intentions of Nicolas the Second and J. Stalin by the lack of sympathy from the West and the need to oppose aggressors questioning Russia’s sovereignty. The authors do not notice that their statements are self-contradictory. In telling about intervention in 1918-1919, they state that the Entente did not intend to divide Russia. But in describing modernization of the country in the 1930s, they explain that Stalin had to develop the military-industrial complex in order to oppose possible aggression against Russia’s sovereignty (a typical justification allowing Stalin to justify the elimination of certain personalities and people). But were there any countries conspiring against “the young Soviet state?” There is a clear connection with Putin’s thesis about a circle of enemies around Russia, or the thesis about a "castle under siege” that justified the Soviet arms race and opposed a Soviet person to all the humankind.

The authors justify the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 23, 1939 saying that otherwise Hitler would have sided with Great Britain against Soviet Russia. While aggression against Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Romania in 1939-1940s s is justified, following the old soviet schemes, as the “liberation” of peoples who formed the Russian Empire. This is the right time to refer to the Jesuit speech by V. Molotov on August 31, 1939 at the 4^th Session of the USSR Supreme Council, published in newspaper “Pravda” on the first day of the Second World War, while the Nazi bombed Polish cities: “We have to admit that there were some blind people in our country who were mesmerized by simplified anti-fascist propaganda and started to forget about the provocateur efforts of our enemies … Only yesterday German fascists implemented a belligerent external policy toward the USSR. Only yesterday we were enemies in our external relations. Nevertheless, today the situation has changed and we stopped being enemies.” Ahead were the final elimination of Komintern and the assassination of its leaders, capture of German communists by the Gestapo, a joint “winners'” parade in Brest, and sending tons and tons of food and strategic raw materials to Germany by rail that did not stop crossing the border of our “allies” even on the eve of June 22, 1941.

Danilov and Co believe that the USSR was the winner in the war with Finland, because the Kremlin achieved its proclaimed goals (?!). But was it really so that Stalin’s’ goal was to adjoin lands to the North of Vyborg? It is common knowledge that in this war Stalin pursued another goal: to attach Finland to the new Soviet empire (O. Kuusinen, like his Polish brothers in 1920, was ready to take the post of the chief Finnish communist in a “new socialist Finland”). But because this goal was not achieved Stalin did not win, he lost. Therefore, the statement about his victory is a typical manipulation of historical facts. This was simply an aggressive imperialist war (the fact recognized by all standing historians) against a small people that did not want to surrender and lay add their heads to the Kremlin execution log.

The conceptual framework contains an unfriendly attack against Poland (“Poland is one of the largest, obviously hostile states to the USSR”). Its authors justify the Katyn’ tragedy not only politically, but also by the barbarian argument “eye for eye, tooth for tooth”. They wrote, "the aassassinations in Katyn’ — were not just an issue of political rationale, but a response to the death of many (dozens of) thousands of Red Army soldiers that perished in Polish prison camps after the war of 1920, which was instigated by Poland, not by Soviet Russia.” An eloquent statement, and every word of it a lie. There are no grounds to compare the scope of killed Russians prisoners with the massive assassination of Poles in Katyn’. (The purpose of the statement — to throw dirt, and let them cleanse themselves afterward). By the way, the Russian Red army also had a concentration camp near Moscow, where Tsirits, UPA general and other Galicia senior officers perished. In 1920 Poland, together with UNR, fought against Russia, which this was absolutely justifiable. Because, following the logic of the authors, Right-Bank Ukraine for Poland was part of the motherland as it belonged to Rech Pospolita until 1795 (this territory had been part of Russia for only slightly over 100 years). We will not even discuss the lawful rights of UNR to its land and the protection of Polish independence near Warsaw, the defense against the attack of Bolshevik Russia and Budionny Army that brought to power a Polish puppet government headed by Dzerzhinsky, Marhlevsky and Kon.

The authors of the aforementioned conceptual framework very sophisticatedly steered textbook authors toward the thesis about the need for direct government regulation, which is necessary to effectively regulate the economy and functioning of society (let us remind that before this was explained by scholars-historians as one of the reasons for the low efficiency of the Soviet political system and economy), then they declare: “It is worth mentioning that the formation of an industrial society in Russia was significantly ahead of the formation of civil society… The blame for this lies with the state.”

Considering the above position, the interpretation of the terror seems quite logical – it is presented as one of the leading instruments of government regulation in a young proletarian state. While warning potential authors that political terror, its grounds, sources and consequences should be reflected in future textbooks, the authors of the concept emphasize: “it is recommended that the thesis of Russia as the birthplace of terror – so popular in the near past – should be unveiled, especially with regard to current internal and external situation”.

In order to unveil the destructive myth, the authors of the conceptual framework recommend future authors, while discussing and assessing the problems of mass oppression during the period of – let’s say “Civil War” (at the same time, the authors absolutely forget that there was also a Ukrainian–anti-Bolshevik war, and Ukrainian – white guard war) – to emphasize its objective nature under existing historical conditions, as well as to highlight the doctrinal factor in setting the Bolshevik oppression as an element of governance. The authors remind that “after one year in power, after the introduction of the first concentration camp, up to 96% of its prisoners were workers who did not meet the target at work or peasants incapable of paying necessary duties to the state” (in other words, they imprisoned their own kin, not just the bourgeoisie). Quite surprisingly, the authors propose to interpret the repression to the Romanov family in connection with its canonization: “it is impossible to employ the term “capital punishment” considering that there was no trial”. It is more rational to speak about “murder” or “assassination”. With regard to the general populace that fell victim to Civil war repression, the authors very strongly recommend “to refer in textbooks to the overall number of victims of Red and White terror at 1 million people, in order to eliminate confusions and misreading other books”.

Here, we would like to highlight another important issue. The conceptual framework's authors absolutely and openly stick to the point that history is written by the victors: it is precisely the winners that interprets the events and outcomes of the Civil war, as the scholars suggest: “the Civil war on one hand resulted in the breakdown and automation of society, on the other hand it was a push toward social development, creativity, reinventing government and society”. And later, “This aspiration toward justice and new order ensured the victory of the Bolsheviks in the Civil war and became an impetus for modernization in the 1930s”. No mention of social tragedies, intellectuals’ warnings about “brother killing brother, father killing son” — only the historical rationale, only the efficiency of management decisions with consideration of future modernization. And long live Vladimir Lenin and his Electrification Plan!

The search of the most efficient management model can explain, according to the authors, the introduction of NEP (new economic policy): “This was the first in the world to establish a regulated market economy system. After a few years, under economic depression, this experience was in demand in the West”. (Not only China combined the advantages of communism with elements of capitalism, ahead of the whole world. The motif of Russia as a birthplace of ideas and innovative management techniques was intensely borrowed by the West and as a result became the main factor in western democratic prosperity is so common that one involuntarily starts thinking that Russia alone was the originator, inspirer and the major factor behind western prosperity. - Authors.)

Nonetheless, let’s go back to the issue of tough government regulation that is so much loved by the authors of the conceptual framework. Apparent parallels between different periods of Soviet history are close and dear to respectful historians: “Liberalization at the bottom and strong arm at the top in relation to the state class. This order probably became a more significant fact and lesson of NEP than the experience of market relations. The neglect of this circumstance during the perestroika period resulted not only in the collapse of the economy, but political structures as well”. As for the major objective of NEP, the authors believe it was “to provide for a fast advance toward industrialization, to build the ground for an industrialized society in the USSR. Unfortunately, this objective was not achieved. The history of NEP is the history of short-term successes and prolonged failures of the new economic model". Therefore, following the logic of Russian historians, the Soviet administration did not have any other way for economic development and optimization but to introduce tough government regulation of internal economic and political life. Here, the authors also resort to forgery — “NEP was not broken, it broke”, “NEP did not manage to set up a reliable supply channel to provide Russian cities, army and industry with bread and raw materials”. It was NEP that provided Ukrainian cities with bread. For us, it was a short period of prosperity. Whereas, problems with bread supply began with collectivization. The authors cheat. There is only a small hint that there was not enough money to buy engineering equipment; the Bolsheviks obtained the necessary money when they sold bread to the West.

The cconceptual framework denies the artificial organization of the famine in Ukraine and Moscow’s involvement in it. It also denies the enormous number of victims, stressing: not 10 million dead, but only one or two million. As evidence, they provide data from ZAGSs records (civil registration centers) that under no condition can be recognized as a valid source of information. Meanwhile, there is scientific methodology for the identification of human losses developed by M. Ptuha, Director of the UVAN Demographic Institute, once among the most outstanding demographics scholars in the USSR. Following his methodology, the number of deaths from the famine in Ukraine is 7 million people.

The contemporary conception of history education in Russia rehabilitates J. Stalin, his terrorist policy against intelligentsia and people and his aggressive foreign policy. The brutal and inhumane methods used during his governance can be justified by his “achievement” – victory in the war. This victory is the excuse for everything: famine, arrests, execution by shooting and finally creation of the social hybrid – “Soviet person”. Furthermore, statements that Stalin was actually a successful “manager” can be heard in Russia today!

Returning to the part of the conceptual framework devoted to the Great Terror, we would like to cite an interesting thesis, “… it is important to note that Stalin acted in a concrete historical situation, he (as a manager) acted quite rationally – he acted as a protector of the system, as a firm supporter of the country’s transformation into an industrial society guided by a single center, as the leader of a country threatened by a great war. The “Great Terror” was stopped immediately after Stalin saw that a monolithic model of society was created. That happened in 1938.” Then, in the authors’ opinion, under the guidance of Lavrentiy Beriya “terror served to promote industrial development: NKVD (People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs) arrested engineers and other specialists necessary for carrying out of different defense tasks in the Far East, in Siberia. Terror turned into a pragmatic method to resolve national economical tasks.” It is hard to comment on such phrases that state that repression can be excused, although the authors included the following sentence: “There are certainly no excuses and explanations to this.” However, the next phrase is shocking: “Nevertheless, repressions served to frighten those that didn’t work properly.” In a word, the historians think that the scale of repression was very overstated, insisting on the “formula” according to which only “those sentenced to death and executed” could be considered repressed. And what about the millions of citizens deported in order to keep “the monolithic character of the system” – Germans, Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars, Chechens, Estonians, Letts, Lithuanians, Greeks, Bulgarians, Poles, Turks, Kalmyk, Koreans (the list can be continued)?

However, why should we agree with this triumph of dictatorship and totalitarianism? Were there not any other alternatives? Did Russian society have no other way to achieve progress?

The February Revolution was a chance for Russia to start a European method of development, which it could use if it did not start the annexation of non-Russian lands, if the Russian middle class and Russian moderate parties searched for allies among the newly created states and stopped the radical Bolshevik force with their help. The Russian Bolshevik neocolonialism, with its idea of the world revolution, was the main problem that didn’t let liberalism and democracy grow in Russia. If Russia was reformatted according to democratic principals in 1920s and over-turned single-party tyranny, then the national-fascists of Europe would not have a bulwark in the East and Europe could have gotten rid of the brown-and-red plague earlier than 1945. Focusing on domestic problems and not on conquest in Eastern Europe could let Russia use its tremendous cultural and scientific potential to its benefit.

In conclusion we would like to note the following. The conceptual framework for history education in Russian secondary schools has a number of drawbacks and carries elements of intentions to implement neo-imperial projects into the mass consciousness. The latest textbooks published under Putin's government interpret Russian history from the standpoint of force; and justify militarism and aggressive intentions of the Russian state. They include xenophobic interpretations and demoralize other nations images, which practically recreates the bipolar model of the J. Stalin-L. Brezhnev times. The authors of Russian textbooks employ a double-standard (what is good for Russians is not good for non-Russians). For instance, the attitude toward collaboration during World War II: they firmly contend that collaboration in the Soviet Union was totally different from collaboration in Germany. The term “collaboration” long ago became a bat to beat for people who did not agree with Stalinism or Soviet philosophy. The Russians consider S. Bandera and Yu. Shukhevich, the leaders of the Ukrainian national-liberating movement, to be collaborators but don’t see any collaboration in the actions of the leaders of the Ukrainian Soviet Social Republic S. Kosior and V. Chubar.

Finally, analyzing the aforementioned information, we have a question: what should be our attitude to appeals of the Russian leadership to agree the modern Russian and Ukrainian textbooks? Can we agree with that “hysteric truth” that is suitable for Russians? This is a rhetorical question. Unfortunately, there are grounds to say that Russia is starting a new informational-and-ideological war against Ukraine in the field of history books. Be careful: nation’s historic memory is a key to the nation’s future.