A humble duet instead of a friendly quintet. Numerous proof-reader corrections instead of a legible scenario. The GUUAM [Georgia-Ukraine-Uzbekistan-Azerbaijan-Moldova] summit in Yalta had been planned as a full-fledged meeting - the first one after a prolonged reanimation. But the integration headways achieved in the last twelve months were nearly canceled out by the truncated format of the summit.
[Azeri President] Geidar Aliyev’s absence was nothing strange - his poor health was an explicit excuse. [Uzbek leader] Islam Karimov’s absence could be explained by his personal “integration allergy syndrome” or mere fatigue. And even if Tashkent does wish to step up its activity within the GUUAM, Karimov hasn’t yet articulated this wish officially. So Uzbek diplomats still have to align with his statements of two years ago, and their counterparts from the other four capitals have to watch the strange metamorphoses in Uzbekistan’s integrative conduct. First Tashkent said that it wasn’t interested in the GUUAM as such. Then it announced its readiness to participate in some specific projects. And now it has become known Uzbekistan is interested in all integrative projects.
But the Moldovan President’s refusal to attend the GUUAM summit is something different, especially considering the fact that, by the rules of rotating presidency, Moldova is to take over this year.
Kyiv noted back in February that Moldovan officials corrected their plans with regard to the GUUAM each time Russian envoys visited Chisinau. This time, Chisinau sent a brief message explaining Voronin’s absence by his sudden illness (allegedly pneumonia), but the illness strangely coincided with the end of a three-day visit to Chisinau by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Trubnikov.
Moreover, according to some sources, long before the summit Ukraine’s Ambassador to the Russian Federation was warned: the Ukrainian side should understand the Moldovan leadership’s difficulties. The situation is too familiar: by bearing down on the weak Moldovan link, Moscow wants to shatter the whole organization. And the Kremlin has enough sticks and carrots to succeed. Last Saturday, a week before the GUUAM summit, Chisinau and Moscow agreed to annul exemptions from the free trade regime. And on July 5 (how promptly!) a special working group was supposed to start negotiating on the size of Moldova’s debt for Russian oil and gas supplies. In the meantime, the Kremlin promises to consider the possibility of reducing the price for natural gas and decide on participating in the privatization of some Moldovan companies. In addition, Russia is ready to urgently replace its ambassador to Moldova. According to some sources, Pavel Petrovsky, whom Moscow believes to be too tolerant about the Transdniestria issue, is going to be replaced by Yuri Zubakov, presently the Ambassador to Lithuania, who has a reputation of a hard advocate of Russian interests there.
There is one more fact: Moscow is bearing down on Chisinau, forcing it to sign a certain document warranting a Russian military operation in Transdniestria. In fact, it is tantamount to legalization of Russian military presence on the left bank of the Dniester, which is unacceptable to the USA and the European Union.
There is, however, a positive side. Such an outburst of the Kremlin’s under-table activity means that the GUUAM is alive and kicking. Relationships within the “quintet” have been fixed organizationally: from the supreme body (annual presidential meetings) and the Council of Foreign Ministers to the Committee of National Coordinators and the Information Center. Seven working groups are already functioning. The Parliamentary Assembly is about to be formed. The GUUAM portfolio has been replenished with seven new documents. Some of them (the Agreement on the GUUAM Virtual Center for Fighting Terrorism, Organized Crime, Drug Proliferation and Other Dangerous Crimes and the Memorandum of Mutual Understanding for Promotion of Trade and Transportation) are directly tied to the implementation of the projects under the GUUAM-USA Framework Program. (It took almost four years to sign a similar memorandum in the frameworks of the project for trade and transportation in South-Eastern Europe). A GUUAM-USA coordinating group is being formed in the US Department of State.
As far as economic cooperation is concerned, Ukraine has almost doubled its trade turnover with Georgia and has “positive dynamics” of trade with the rest member nations. But this fact is not decisive for the GUUAM Trade and Transportation Promotion Project as this project is oriented primarily at materializing the GUUAM’s transit potential. A new body - the Council of GUUAM Presidential Representatives for Development of Oil Transportation Corridors - convened its constituent meeting in Yalta. The Council is a kind of the GUUAM’s “supportive” contribution to the Odessa-Brody-Plock oil transportation project. International organizations demonstrate unusual unanimity. In Vienna, the GUUAM envoys even had to set up something like an advisory council - it’s only thanks to constant coordination that they manage to counter the OSCE’s intrigues.
One more interesting fact. Invitations to last year’s summit were sent at Kyiv’s discretion. This time, initiative came from the guests: the organizers had to correct the list of invitees many times. As a result, the Yalta summit was attended by guests from 19 countries and 10 international organizations (versus 5 and 10 respectively at last year’s summit).
It’s an open secret that the GUUAM got a boost after the United States began to partake in its activities. Moreover, as the ZN was tipped off by a Western expert close to the US Department of State and the White House, Washington’s support for the GUUAM is not temporary. According to him, the policy toward the GUUAM which is conducted by the Bush Administration differs from the policy conducted by the previous US leadership: the Bush Administration doesn’t care at all about how Moscow or Brussels look upon this organization. (This circumstance may make Ukraine’s prospects for Euro-Atlantic integration brighter.)
And if our neighbors are unnerved by the fact of Washington’s attention to the GUUAM, they had better watch their own alliances. For instance, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which Russian mass media counterpose to the GUUAM so vehemently. While its policymakers were racking their brains, trying to find ropes to tie down the GUUAM member countries, Tajikistan and the USA signed an agreement on military cooperation and reconstruction of a runway at the Dushanbe airport.
“We should welcome the fact that…the United States has assumed the great responsibility for eradicating international terrorism.” Was this stated by Georgia’s national security secretary or Azerbaijan’s defense minister? Wrong. This was just a response of a Kirghiz official to [Belarus President] Lukashenko’s indignant remark about the presence of foreign troops on the territory of a CSTO member country (to wit, Kirghizstan) “without consent from the other members”.
One thing is clear: Moscow still opposes whatever initiatives on the post-Soviet territory but its own. Even though the GUUAM has no intention to isolate itself in implementing its projects. On the contrary, the quintet’s idea is to join forces in materializing the plans which are already being developed in the frameworks of other international organizations (the UN, the TRASECA, the Europol) and need reinforcement. For example, the GUUAM Center for Fighting Terrorism, Drug Proliferation and Other Dangerous Crimes is going to be established on the basis of the UN regional office for fighting drugs and crime.
