Coercion to Action

As is widely known, the anticipation of a war is more unnerving than the war itself. The one who plans an attack and the one who braces for defense are both prisoners of conventionalities. War is real. It makes the world simpler, harder, brighter, and more tangible. Extremity sharpens the senses, tempers the will, and airs the brain. Emergency compels us to act and look for solutions to the problems that previously seemed unsolvable.

The Ukrainian political circles could not remain still for too long. Some political leaders pretended to be fighting the crisis while others pretended to be negotiating a new coalition or gearing up for the race. The guile and futility of their efforts was visible to the naked eye. Something had to happen. So it did.

The dismissal of the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada was a very good accelerator of developments. Firstly, it did not harm the country like the use of force could have. One MP ironically referred to it as “bloodless phlebotomy” and was generally right. Secondly, it kicked off a game in which all key players without exception are after a prize.

There are two extremely important aspects. Firstly, the price of the post that was put on auction this week is very high, even under the present conditions of high political inflation. Secondly, the speaker is an important link in the chain of state decision-making. His absence causes hypoxia and subsequent clinical death. The President’s resignation would be less painful to the country, because his functions would be taken over by the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada. A vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister would not shatter the government, as the Premier would continue heading the government, only in the capacity of “acting Prime Minister” until the parliament appointed a successor. In this case the Constitution does not provide for an “acting” speaker of the parliament. Even the vice speaker has no right to sign bills passed by the parliament as this right is vested exclusively in the legitimately elected Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada.

In the absence of the speaker it is difficult to fight the economic crisis because the unsigned anti-crisis bills are just sheets of paper and it is impossible to start the election campaign because the budget bill (with funds earmarked for the election) is invalid without his signature. In some cases the speaker has the right to sign normative acts in lieu of the President, but even the President has no right to act for the speaker.

It should also be noted that the absence of “the first among equals” undermines the parliament’s public legitimacy: the MPs’ inability to elect a speaker is sure to irritate voters much more than their failure to build a coalition did.

Thus, everyone is interested in a speaker. Moreover, the dismissal of Arseniy Yatsenyuk has given short-term benefits to everyone, including him. Now it is up to each player to make the most of the cards dealt. Each has an opportunity to risk and bluff. Each has to show his cards – i.e. offer posts, money, and his services. It is unimportant who dealt the cards, though the name is an open secret.

The Mover and the Shaker

It is pointless to debate about who was behind Yatsenyuk’s dismissal – Yushchenko or his alter-ego Baloha: if Yushchenko had not profited from his confidant, he would have long sacrificed him. Besides, both were interested in “beheading” the parliament: Yushchenko got the tactical initiative and Baloha demonstrated his usefulness again.

Did Yatsenyuk phone Yushchenko? Did Yushchenko phone Yanukovych or Lytvyn? If he did, what did he tell them? Regardless of the answers, one thing is certain: Yushchenko did want his protégé to go. At least two men have confirmed that he called them and raised the question of Yatsenyuk’s dismissal. Both told the author that when Yushchenko was asking about the probability he hardly concealed his joy.

Yushchenko must have had two objectives. One was quite petty – to “punish” Yatsenyuk for his growing popularity rating, for his reluctance to run for parliament under the President’s banner, and for his sabotage of Bankova’s legislative initiatives. According to some sources, Yatsenyuk’s recent visit to the United States was not green-lighted by Yushchenko. His attempts to build bridges to Obama’s entourage infuriated Yushchenko. He was not even admitted to the departure ceremony when Yushchenko was leaving for Warsaw. It is rumored that he complained to Premier Tymoshenko that he had been unable to get through to Yushchenko for weeks. Many accused him of “playing to Tymoshenko’s hand.” It is not important if he did so. It is important that Yushchenko believes he did. If there was someone who could believe that Yatsenyuk was invited to the top five on the candidate roll of the Tymoshenko Bloc, it was only Yushchenko.

Another objective was pragmatic. Yushchenko knew what he would gain from Yatsenyuk’s dismissal: he would either get a more tractable speaker ready to furnish funds for the parliamentary election or get a disarmed and uncontrollable parliament ready to be dissolved. In the worse case scenario, he would have a short-term advantage: the Tymoshenko government would be left without legislative backup to its anti-crisis initiatives and without the rostrum for pre-election self-canvassing. In the best case scenario, he would get the coveted majority in the parliament without the election. Unfortunately and alarmingly, Bankova seems to be deliberately bringing this chaos to a head in order to bring Yushchenko out as a pillar of wisdom and power and his chancellery as the only operative body.

At the same time, Yushchenko is going to inevitably sustain losses. Of course, he wants to keep clear of it, hoping that some simpletons will later believe in his story about “Baloha’s sly intrigues.” But they might as well wonder why they should support the president who tolerates such an erratic subordinate. And those who will not believe will justly call Yushchenko “the man who buried the Orange Dream for good.”

Now, exactly four years after the Orange Revolution began [on November 21], the words “Maidan” [Maidan Nezalezhnosti in Kyiv, site of mass protest actions during the Orange Revolution] and “my nation” have vanished from Yushchenko’s active vocabulary. Small wonder – all that remains today from his once huge popularity is “positive attitude of some Ukrainians.” Now, even some of those “some Ukrainians” may part with their illusions about him.

Besides, Yatsenyuk’s dismissal has undoubtedly made Yushchenko less respected by the faction that is still habitually called “pro-presidential.”

Fractions of the Faction

The stress experienced by the parliament in general and the Our Ukraine – People’s Self-Defense in particular may either consolidate the faction or destroy it completely. Conversations with different members of that faction have convinced the author that it is the most democratic one in this parliament: as many people as many opinions.

The “idealists” are sure that Baloha’s days at the head of the presidential secretariat are numbered, but their optimism looks unfounded. Yatsenyuk’s dismissal scared those in the Yushchenko camp. They weighed their chances to be entered on the OU-PSD candidate roll and the bloc’s chances to enter the new parliament and were saddened…

Bankova never informed the OU-PSD faction about its plans, but its formal opponents from the Regions Party were initiated.

Not a single member of the OU-PSD faction wants this preterm election, but most of them know that it is unavoidable. They know that the only alternative to the undesirable race is a new coalition. The speaker’s dismissal gave them a fresh impetus to negotiate with the Tymoshenko Bloc and the Lytvyn Bloc. Even those who have never dared to deviate from the line drawn by Bankova are now involved in the negotiating process. Their motivation has changed. Now they talk less of following the leader’s course and more of chances to survive. They are earnestly grateful to the President for this chance, albeit spectral, to restore the ruined alliance. All they have achieved so far is the decision made by the OU-PSD faction on Friday to resume coalition talks with the Tymoshenko Bloc and the Lytvyn Bloc. Alexander Tretyakov’s proposal to ally with the Regions Party was turned down unanimously (which came as a total surprise for the RP).

Notorious “Consistency”

The RP leaders and sponsors expected confusion in the OU-PSD ranks and hoped that the majority of its members would be for such a “grand coalition.” Their fear of the election ought to have been the reason. The need to unite in order to avoid an economic collapse ought to have been the pretext. Yushchenko’s desire to see the coalition of the OU-PSD and the RP (and readiness to press for the election in any other case) was a concomitant factor. Alas, all was for naught.

Yet, they have nothing to complain about. Their consistent helplessness in achieving their own political goals irritated their voters, so they badly needed a victory. They got it very easily, although they had never organized or executed anything and had only played crowd scenes.

Now they have a chance to have a controllable speaker. It would be good for them to have Olexandr Lavrynovych at the post, but his chances are miserable. Ivan Plyushch would be OK to both Akhmetov and Yushchenko, but the OU-PSD, the Communists, and the Lytvyn Bloc are not ready yet to vote for him.

Volodymyr Lytvyn appears to be the most acceptable candidate, but talks with him have been going poorly. One influential member of the RP confessed that “any candidate would do as long as he would not hamper the election campaign. The RP is perhaps the only political force in the incumbent parliament that still wants the election. Most of its members are sure that:

- they would be in the coalition majority even if they came in second in the race;

- the pro-Yushchenko bloc would be a part of the coalition and they would obtain influence over the President;

- a member of the RP would be the new premier;

- if the RP got full control of the government and parliament, the name of the president would not matter.

It would be best for the RP to hold the election in February or March: by that time they expect the crisis to make Yushchenko more complaisant and Tymoshenko less dangerous. That is why they are not going to help Yushchenko oust Tymoshenko.

Queen of “Hearts”

That is what Tymoshenko feared most of all. She and her comrades were sure that the speaker’s dismissal was only a prelude to hers. That is why they tried so hard to block the vote. When it became clear that the alarm was false, they tried to save face while retreating to their reserve line of defense.

Now that the speaker’s chair is vacant (thanks to Yushchenko and Baloha), Tymoshenko has the opportunity to trade the position that does not belong to her. Now she has something to offer Lytvyn. According to sources with the Tymoshenko Bloc, she is even ready to pay for the loyal majority with the posts of Transport and Environment Ministers and Ukrzaliznytsya [Ukraine Railroads] and Ukravtodor [Ukraine Automobile Roads]. Sources within the Lytvyn Bloc flatly deny that such talks have taken place. Sources with the RP who watch the process closely confirm it.

Now Tymoshenko has a unique chance to have a hand in forming a majority loyal to the government and can hold out feeble hope for a pro-government coalition. She understands how difficult it will be for her to use this chance, but she also knows that she will never have a second chance. Voluntary resignation would be the first step into political oblivion.

However, if the future speaker and the future majority are not loyal to Tymoshenko, she has reserved the right to leave the Cabinet – right on the eve of the practically inevitable election.