Yulia Tymoshenko: Simultaneous Game Session

Author: Yulia MOSTOVAYA

A preterm parliamentary election has been announced in the country where 34 percent of people have found a political force that fully corresponds with their views and aspirations; 32 percent vote for the party they like but would vote for another if it appeared better; 22 percent see no political force that could represent their interests.

Ukrainian voters are going to witness yet another combat in the ongoing battle for power at their expense. The record sum paid so far by one person for entering Parliament is $20 million. The man who paid it knew what he was doing: in the country that lives without rules it is easier to survive in a pack.

Experienced veterans know what to do to win this two-round race by enlisting voters’ support in the first round and collecting votes in the second. In the campaign staffs of the major political forces, different people are in charge of each round. In the Regions Party Boris Kolesnikov is in charge of public relations and canvassing while organizational management is in the care of Vasyl Djarty. The whole campaign staff is headed by Viktor Yanukovych who is personally responsible for the party’s result in this race. In the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc the “creative” part of the canvassing campaign is entrusted to Olexandr Turchynov and the ballot count is the responsibility of Bogdan Gubsky. Unlike Turchynov, Gubsky knows that a calculator is for convincing but not beating (though both ways might prove effective).

The distribution of campaign responsibilities in the pro-presidential political bloc is still unclear. Yushchenko, who has been pushing the country to this election so long and hard, is the least of all prepared for it. Money is not the biggest problem – the Our Ukraine has more of it than it has supporters. The biggest problem is dissociation in the bloc’s ranks. Its political council has firmly stated its objections to a) the presence of the Yedyniy Tsentr in Yushchenko’s bloc; b) inclusion of individual members of the Yedyniy Tsentr in the bloc’s election roll as potential “frondeurs”; c) Viktor Baloha as the chief of campaign staff (the best he is believed to deserve is the post of Transcarpathia governor). The bloc’s composition is also unclear. Viktor Yushchenko is most likely to top its election roll, Arseniy Yatsenyuk is expected to be second, and Vyacheslav Kyrylenko third. Kyiv Mayor Leonid Chernovetsky, formally remaining in Yushchenko’s bloc, is set to run for parliament independently. Yuri Kostenko’s Ukrainian People’s Party is also likely to join in. Yet, it is still unclear who is going to head the campaign staff – Tretyakov, Baloha, or Bezsmertny. The name will be known on Monday.

Another problem is the illusion of “huge” administrative resources. In fact, very few governors have enough weight and influence in their regions. Even Kyiv governor Vira Ulyanchenko has a low popularity rating – a mere 3.2 percent. Bankova has failed to replace “dear friends,” “relatives,” and moneybags with experienced professional bureaucrats as it planned. There is no and will hardly be political unity in the top ranks of the Interior Ministry. Military servicemen no longer vote at the order and under the supervision of their commanders. No doubt, the pro-presidential force that aims to collect 20-25 percent (!) in this election will employ all available administrative resources – at least to demonstrate Yushchenko’s higher ratings at the start of the presidential race. This task, however, is hardly feasible.

Borys Tarasyuk with his People’s Rukh and Yuri Lutsenko with his People’s Self-Defense are determined to join the Tymoshenko Bloc. Some of its members are afraid they might have to make way for the unwelcome allies in the top part of the election roll, but Tymoshenko is not. She invited to her bloc all those members of the Our Ukraine – People’s Self-Defense who were for restoring the democratic coalition. Not all of them have accepted her invitation but those who have may count on a good quota. Tymoshenko counts on at least 190 seats in the new parliament and has promised at least 20 mandates to the heads of regional organizations. It looks like the force majeure of this preterm election forces Tymoshenko to use the technology she planned to use in the future presidential race – creation of a democratic election bloc.

Volodymyr Lytvyn is ready. So are members and sponsors of his namesake bloc. He knows perfectly what voters talk about in their kitchens and shares this knowledge with whatever audience he addresses. The Lytvyn Bloc stands a fair chance of entering Parliament and may well offer a plan for overcoming the systemic crisis – one of those he must have heard from kitchen talks.

Oleg Tyahnybok is becoming a public favorite in Lviv and Dmytro Tabachnyk is contemplating a return to his ideological roots – the Communist Party.

…However, all this may be in vain if the election law is not amended. The majority of MPs are for amending it, but experts doubt that the amendment bill will collect enough votes in the session hall. Besides, no one can use money for the election from the government’s reserve fund or the State Treasury without the Prime Minister’s permission. The 60-day pre-election schedule is rather vulnerable to the least sabotage by the Central Election Commission where Tymoshenko’s representatives have strong positions. Any irregularity may be used as a pretext for a shower of lawsuits and subsequently an annulment of returns. The RP used this method last year and Yushchenko had to issue several decrees to dissolve Parliament. If the TB decides to impede the election, it will be quite easy, but half measures are not in Tymoshenko’s style.

Tymoshenko canceled her televised address to the nation on Friday. Her press secretary Maryna Soroka gave no explanations, but one of the reasons may be her meeting with Yushchenko – the first in months – on which they may have agreed. If they do meet, the public will be told afterwards that the President and the Premier “met to discuss steps to overcome the economic crisis which the National Security and Defense Council is to address on Monday.” However, according to the sources that allege such a meeting between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko, the actual subject should be the withdrawal of the presidential decree on the parliament’s dissolution due to the restoration of the coalition. The price which Tymoshenko has to pay for retaining her post and additional competences of the government is but too obvious: besides conceding the posts of interior, transport, and energy ministers she must vow her support for Yushchenko in the 2010 presidential election.

Tymoshenko is playing versus Yushchenko on three chessboards at a time: she is gearing up for the race; she is trying to impede the race; she would like to cancel the race. The prize in each game is power. Who says they will agree to a draw?