This is More than a Crisis

MP Yuri But of the Our-Ukraine - People’s Self-Defense faction and Igor Rybakov of the Tymoshenko faction have seceded from the coalition of democratic forces, leaving it short of two votes and actually turning it into the minority. It is not that important whether they might eventually join the new party named “Yedyniy Tsentr” [United Center] which Presidential Secretariat Chief Viktor Baloha is trying to build on the ashes of the Orange forces. What really matters is the immediate consequences of their demarche for the fragile coalition and the political situation in the country.

Under the circumstances it is difficult to make any forecasts because, as Gestapo Chief Mueller said, “It’s hard to comprehend the logic of non-professionals.” It is already common knowledge that the fate of this country is in the hands of politicos rather than statesmen. Regrettably enough, it must take some time for the roily post-Soviet brew to distill into transparent and strong alcohol.

Just as the coalition was being formed, ZN presumed that due to the impossibility of a peaceful coexistence between Tymoshenko and Yushchenko, due to the fact that too many hated to see Tymoshenko at the head of the government, and due to the endless negotiation process between Bankova and the Regions Party there would be two coalitions in the parliament – a formal and a shadow one.

As long as the coalition numbered 227 votes, it was the majority – de facto and de jure. On June 6 it shrank to 225 and became the arithmetical minority. It is unclear whether and when it is going to become the political minority.

In accordance with the Constitution, the coalition majority must be formed within 30 days. Does this mean that the 30-day countdown started on Friday? Not at all – since Speaker Arseniy Yatsenyuk has not announced the termination of the coalition as required by Verkhovna Rada Regulations. He has ten days and only he knows what he will finally decide. On the other hand, the Constitutional Court has ruled the Regulations invalid because it must be a law, not the parliament’s internal document. Now anyone can refer to this ruling and block attempts to reformat the coalition.

Those who say that the coalition has ceased to exist refer to Paragraph 66 of the Regulations which reads that the coalition is no longer valid in case its numerical strength is smaller than 226. In other words, if there are fewer than 226 MPs, there is no coalition.

Those who claim that the coalition is not dead refer to the fact that the coalition consists of factions rather than individual MPs.

Of course, the leaders of the coalition will try to do everything possible to save it. They have several options.

They may try to “patch the hole” by enlisting at least one member of some other faction in the opposition camp (several recruits would be better). Surprisingly, a high-ranking representative of the Regions Party told the author in a private conversation that a couple of men in his faction might join the coalition. As to Lytvyn and his namesake “non-aligned” faction, he never took an oath of allegiance to either camp, so they might also beef up the coalition.

Another option is the coalition’s enlargement with the Lytvyn faction in a body. It may look strange but it is quite possible. According to well-informed sources, members of the Lytvyn faction would join the coalition, Lytvyn would take the speaker’s seat, and Yatsenyuk would replace Stelmakh in the post of National Bank governor. Why not? Firstly, the National Bank is just across the street; secondly, banking is more up to Yatsenyuk’s professional background and qualifications. Lytvyn has his own reasons to agree to such a reshuffle. He does not want a preterm election, knowing that it would be “a battle of titans” where such “minnows” as his motley bloc would have no chance at all. Lytvyn’s popularity rating is on the rise but still not high enough for a landslide victory in elections.

If Tymoshenko wants to stay in office, she needs to patch up or enlarge the coalition before the parliament’s summer vacation or block the parliament’s work by raising debatable and provocative issues or besieging the rostrum. Then she could wobble along till September, waiting for a denouement.

If Tymoshenko opts for the coalition’s breakup as a way out of this stalemate and her resignation as salvation, then, apparently, the two deserters must have played stunts in Tymoshenko’s scenario. However, their personal ambitions and their previous words and deeds cast doubts on such a presumption. Here is just one fact: Rybakov was a member of the commission set up by President Yushchenko to investigate Kyiv Mayor Leonid Chernovetsky’s alleged involvement in unlawful deals. To Yushchenko’s satisfaction, the commission found nothing unlawful.

Yushchenko’s advisers tried to persuade him to keep Tymoshenko in her post till the fall or even mid-January and so bear the whole brunt of popular dissatisfaction with inflation, price hikes, and other problems and misfortunes that would have piled up by then. Did he lack patience? Or did he decide that inflation alone would be enough to send her rating downhill and that Yanukovych would take the blame for the doubled gas price in winter? It looks like Tymoshenko will either use her chance or get stuck in a monkey trap with a handful of raisins.

Yanukovych would rather confront difficulties than put up with the opposition status. He might as well stand aloof watching his opponents drown each other – just like in 2006. Every week his shadow government rubberstamps resolutions, but they are nothing tangible. They can not yield profits and can not help him redeem Vanco or Dniproenergo… His party wants to regain power and Yushchenko has to reckon with this fact, at least because without its shadow backup he would lose the last of his influence. Yushchenko knows that without even theoretical chances for a grand coalition with the Regions Party and without the prosecutor general – its protégé – he is a political loser. As long as the RP needs Yushchenko, he poses as the rudder and performs all functions that go with it. But Yanukovych wants more than just a grand coalition. He is after premiership and he is considering Yushchenko’s preconditions. They are formulated in no uncertain terms: firstly, he has to forget about running for president; secondly, in the new parliament 50 percent of seats have to be reserved for individual nominees of political parties; thirdly, he has to guarantee that all governors and other senior officials will be appointed with Yushchenko’s consent.

There are countless details and variants of this tussle, and it would take hours to speculate on the likelihood of another preterm election, delve into the personal characteristics and biographies of potential deserters, calculate the odds of various configurations of a grand coalition, and so on and so forth… Unfortunately, the word “reform” has almost vanished from the Ukrainian political vocabulary. Unfortunately, the presidential chancellery orders prosecutors to arrest mid-rank officials for minor offenses and to release masterminds of contract murders. Unfortunately, the currency exchange rate has become a commodity – the same with national interests. Unfortunately, the top leaders of the state are at war with one another, never caring about the 46 million people who have to live with all this mess. On top of that, on June 27 Ukraine may well become the first country to be disgracefully stripped of the right to host UEFA finals.

This is not a political crisis. This is degradation.