Object of Exchange

So what did President Viktor Yushchenko get in Bucharest? He said it was “an exceptional victory” while German Ambassador Reinhard Schäfers called it “a compromise.” “Ukraine did not achieve the maximum it counted on and NATO does not regard it as a success,” the ambassador commented on Yushchenko’s appraisal.

Success is a relative notion. The fact that Albania and Croatia were invited to NATO is definitely their success while the postponement of Macedonia is its failure. A C is surely a success for a student who has never had anything higher than a D, but it is a disgraceful failure for an A-student.

Kyiv expected nothing less than an invitation to the NATO Membership Action Plan in Bucharest, but when NATO said in its statement that Ukraine and Georgia would join it some day, Yushchenko called it “an exceptional victory.” He must have confused two organizations: it is from the European Union that Ukraine has long been hoping to get “a clear signal of eventual membership” while NATO’s statement was nothing but a reiteration of its “open-door policy for Ukraine.” In Bucharest Yushchenko got the same old present in a brightly decorated wrap. (The same happened in 2005 when the EU “presented” the new Orange government with the Action Plan drawn up a year before for the Yanukovych government.) The decision made in Bucharest contained no “added value” for Kyiv. Only the MAP would have.

Yet, even George Bush was unable to persuade the European allies to grant it to Ukraine…

The Final Cut

Bush, inspired by the victorious Orange Revolution, first planned to visit Ukraine in the summer of 2006 – after “the first-ever democratic parliamentary election” in this country. All formal diplomatic prearrangements were complete and everything was ready for Bush’s visit, but the protracted division of power among the Orange winners and anti-NATO protests in Crimea damped Washington’s enthusiasm. The visit was canceled.

It was only a few weeks ago that the 43^rd U.S. president finally decided to fly to Kyiv – when Washington saw relative political stability in Ukraine. Besides, Yushchenko must have convinced Condoleezza Rice and George Bush that Kyiv was very serious about joining the MAP. There were other prerequisites behind Bush’s visit: a strong pro-Ukrainian lobby and the Ukrainian embassy’s active work, numerous letters to the White House requesting support for Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic ambitions (even Jewish organizations sent such a letter), unanimous support in both houses of the U.S. Congress, and similar statements on that score by all the three major candidates for presidency.

Evidently, it was not just Bush’s own initiative to promote Ukraine but a part of Washington’s foreign policy which will hardly change no matter who succeeds Bush. And personally to Bush it was a matter of honor after Putin warned that Russia would retarget its missiles at Ukraine in the event it joined NATO. Besides, the stubborn Texan was set to go the distance even after several phone conversations with the unyielding German chancellor. He was determined to regain America’s positions in Europe and prove that Washington’s influence was still there. In the twilight of his presidency the Republican administration badly needed to show voters any success in the international arena. Against the background of Iraq, Afghanistan, the Middle East, and the entire post-USSR space Ukraine could be a “success story”: democracy growing stronger from election to election, economic growth, and active participation in peacekeeping efforts could serve as a very good example.

That is where the interests of Washington and Kyiv coincided in time: both needed to demonstrate their success. Bush’s visit to Kyiv and Ukraine’s bid for the NATO Membership Action Plan got the widest coverage in international mass media since the Orange Revolution in 2004. Ukraine enlisted pronounced support from the superpower and the United States demonstrated its willingness to go to bat for a young democracy. The interests also coincided in Ukraine’s energy security, its role as a reliable transporter of natural gas to Europe, and diversification of energy supplies. As an additional argument Kyiv wanted to demonstrate complete unanimity of the three branches of power and formally proved such unanimity with a letter to the NATO Secretary General signed by the President, the Prime Minister, and the Parliament Speaker. The three asked in no uncertain terms for an invitation to the MAP at the Bucharest summit. Besides, both Yushchenko and Tymoshenko had repeatedly assured the White House of the “firmness of the democratic coalition,, stated the importance of “transparent fuel supply schemes,” guaranteed further economic reforms, and pledged to fight corruption. (Each must have meant his or her own way but hoped that Bush would not be particular about details.)

Although the Bucharest summit was the focal subject of the talks in Kyiv, the sides also discussed other issues and even signed a few documents. They might just as well have been signed at any other time, but Kyiv used the opportunity for political reasons. On the eve of Bush’s arrival Kyiv and Washington signed two agreements and a US-Ukraine road map for two years.

The agreement on trade and investment cooperation is the first step toward a future free trade agreement. All countries that have a free trade regime with the United States began with such a document. The agreement provides for setting up a permanent US-Ukraine trade and investment council to tackle all related issues, including debatable ones.

The framework agreement on cooperation in peaceful space research is supposed to provide a legal basis for space cooperation between U.S. and Ukrainian companies. Ukrainian diplomats expect the agreement to help Ukraine get its foot in the door of the global hi-tech market. In particular, Ukrainian enterprises are supposed to provide launching complexes for U.S. satellites and take part in Lunar and Martian exploration programs.

Experts view the contract between the national nuclear power company Energoatom and Westinghouse on the supply of fissile fuel for the South-Ukrainian NPP as a significant step toward diversification of fissile fuel supplies to Ukrainian nuclear power plants. The Russians, who claim a monopoly on such supplies, immediately responded with angry commentaries.

The contract with Holtec provides for construction of a storage facility for used nuclear fuel from Ukrainian NPPs. Holtec representatives compare it with “a gold depository” since, thanks to modern technologies, it is possible to reuse nuclear fuel.

The road map signed by Ukraine’s Deputy Foreign Minister Volodymyr Khandogiy and U.S. Undersecretary of State Daniel Fried (one of a score of similar road maps with other countries which President Yushchenko likes to sign so much). It lists immediate priorities in cooperation between the United States and Ukraine and actually supplements the joint statement the two presidents made in Washington, DC, on April 4, 2005.

Contrary to numerous forecasts made on the eve of and even during Bush’s visit, the U.S. side put no pressure on Ukraine regarding traditionally sensitive issues. Firstly, Washington did not demand that Kyiv recognize Kosovo’s independence. The sides stated unanimously that Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence would not create a precedent. Secondly, Washington understands all the reasons why Ukraine prefers to stay aloof from the much disputed deployment of U.S. missile defense systems in Eastern Europe. That is why Bush did not raise this issue in Kyiv and only spoke of military-technical cooperation on terms favorable for Ukraine. Thirdly, Bush thanked Ukraine for its contribution to the international operations in Afghanistan but did not insist on increasing its presence there.

Both presidents were satisfied with the visit and each other. They told reporters that the entire spectrum of US-Ukrainian relations would be discussed in detail at the fourth session of the interagency coordinating group co-chaired by Khandogiy and Fried. Besides, Premier Tymoshenko might visit the USA this summer and President Yushchenko might pay a visit there this fall. Why? What can those visits give Ukraine in the last weeks of Bush’s presidency? The answer is simple: they are meant to secure the achieved level of relations, establish closer contacts with members of a new team and pay due respect to the outgoing one – to President Bush, who took a risk and lost to President Putin in the fight for Ukraine.

Russia’s Third Victory over Germany

The ZN wrote back last fall that Ukraine would not be invited to the MAP in Bucharest. Practically all experts, politicians, and diplomats we interviewed said the same. Nevertheless, Kyiv decided to play this game and chose the tactics of a sudden psychological attack. Considering the fact that the letter to the NATO Secretary General was a surprise even to the Americans, that decision was not only risky – it was dangerous for Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration plans.

It was clear to all that Ukraine had very slim chances in Bucharest, but Bankova [seat of the Presidential Secretariat] trumpeted its “confidence in a positive response from NATO” and announced the Bucharest summit as “a moment of truth in relations with NATO”.

Meeting with the leaders of the pro-presidential bloc Our Ukraine – People’s Self-Defense on the eve of the summit, Yushchenko said he would not go to Bucharest without complete confidence in getting the MAP there and heard applause in reply… Excessive expectations make disappointments stronger, as a rule. Was it someone’s artful plan or yet another political blunder now sold to the Ukrainian public as “an exceptional victory”? According to some sources, Yushchenko’s first reaction to NATO’s decision was very emotional: he thought his planners and advisers had just set him up. Now Bankova is anticipating staff reshuffles…

Now Yushchenko knows that the outcome of the Bucharest summit was “fated” and that he should have sought the MAP without all that unnecessary symbolism, without those loud statements, and without timing the coveted “historic decision” to the Bucharest summit. Calm routine work and practical steps would be far more productive and Ukraine would be invited to the MAP this fall at a regular session of the NATO-Ukraine Commission. There would be no pompous ceremony but the country would get an invitation to the MAP instead of lexical exercises.

Ukrainian diplomats had worked hard to secure a positive outcome of the Bucharest summit, traveling to European capitals, holding numerous consultations, arranging for the top leaders’ visits and phone contacts, but what could they do in ten weeks after years wasted? At his joint press conference with Bush, Yushchenko said proudly, “We have only just embarked on the public information campaign, but as many as 40 percent of our citizens are already for joining NATO.” Wrong, Mr. President: the actual number is at least twice smaller. Besides, you say that Ukraine’s membership in NATO is “a key, fundamental national interest,” but what has kept you from launching the NATO information campaign in the three years of your presidency? And what made you hope for success, knowing how the two NATO heavyweights – Germany and France – were set? Did you believe so much in Bush’s “omnipotence”?

In Bucharest the U.S. President suffered yet another defeat. That is where the whole world saw that Uncle Sam had lost his former influence on Europe and that he had underestimated the strength of anti-American sentiment in the Old World. Members of the U.S. delegation were shocked to see four-letter words on anti-NATO slogans and banners raised by several hundred supporters of the Communist Party and like-minded leftist parties in Kyiv. Bush must have recalled Paris, where he had faced tens of thousands of protesters…

Kyiv entrusted its hope to Washington and lost. Instead, it should have worked more seriously with Berlin and Paris. In fact, it should have started this work long ago. In all its years of independence Ukraine never became interesting to Germany or France – at least not interesting enough not to be victimized so easily and cynically to their peace and Russia’s favors.

Paris and Berlin swear that Moscow has nothing to do with their position, but Kyiv has no illusions on that score and knows for sure who stood behind their refusal to invite Ukraine to the MAP. The Bucharest summit has even been compared to the Munich conference…

Germany’s official explanations sounded reasonable enough. Frau Merkel said she was concerned about the absence of unanimity among the Ukrainian political leaders on the MAP issue and the low level of popular support for the idea of joining NATO. France was more outspoken. Premier François Fillon admitted, “We are against inviting Georgia and Ukraine because we believe that it would be the wrong response to the balance of forces in Europe between Europe and Russia, and we want to negotiate this issue with Russia.” On the other hand, some sources say that if Angela Merkel had agreed to invite Ukraine to the MAP, Nicolas Sarkozy would not have objected.

In fact, Ukraine has long been ready for the MAP, considering its level of democracy, economic progress, defense reform, and active participation in all NATO-led peacekeeping operations. In this case NATO demonstrated a policy of double standards. Take, for instance, Albania. In Bucharest it was invited to full NATO membership, but when it joined the MAP in 1999 it was way below the level at which Ukraine is today.

Interestingly, there are no official criteria for joining the MAP, so why lay down the law that applies to candidates for membership? Besides, prevalent popular support for joining NATO is not required for joining the MAP which, as NATO officials explain, does not guarantee membership and only outlines a program of political, economic, defense, security, and other reforms. As it turns out, NATO pays lip service to Ukraine’s “Euro-Atlantic aspirations and efforts” but in practice refuses to provide it with a plan of such reforms. As Slovakia’s and Slovenia’s experience shows, only successful reforms can cardinally change the public opinion in a country seeking membership in NATO.

Of course, they may invent anything for Ukraine. In Bucharest they proposed intensifying the Intensified Dialog. Maybe in December they will offer an action plan for joining the Membership Action Plan… Polish President Lech Kaczynski deserves gratitude for reminding Germany that it was admitted to NATO in 1955 despite the fact that not all European states had recognized the borders of the FRG and a divided Berlin posed a potential military threat. In 1955 the alliance, despite all risks, made “a courageous decision,” as Kaczynski wrote addressing the other 25 NATO members. Now, in Bucharest, the alliance made “a compromise decision.” As far as Ukraine is concerned, the “compromise” is more or less clear: denying it the MAP, NATO replaced the trite term “open door” with a more sonorous but no more meaningful assurance that Ukraine and Georgia would join NATO some day. There is a difference, of course, at least in the wording, and that is so helpful to the one who badly needs to report a success and wants to save face.

What did Germany or France sacrifice by making such a “compromise decision”? Nothing. On the contrary, they scored some points, at least in the eyes of the Kremlin. Yes, they promised NATO membership to Ukraine, but one can always find faults – even at the threshold. Next time they might find that NATO is short of one percent of popular support in Ukraine or that Ukraine still lags behind the USA in terms of defense spending… German Ambassador to Ukraine Reinhard Schäfers said honestly in a TV interview that Germany and other NATO members “do not think that Ukraine’s accession to NATO may pose a threat to Russia, but they have to reckon with the perception (!) of this step in Russia.” According to the German diplomat, there is no threat to Russia, but it takes time to convince the Russian leaders and the rest of the people about it. What if they fail to?

Why should Paris quarrel with Russia over Ukraine after Sarkozy did Moscow such a bad turn by annulling all military contracts with Russia? Why should Berlin go against the grain after Moscow defeated it for the third time? Actually, the correct word instead of “defeated” is “bought.” Russia simply bought Germany with natural gas, pipelines, and contracts for big companies. What made Hungary so cautious in Bucharest? – Maybe Russia’s readiness to invest ? 2 billion in the 300-km section of the South Stream pipeline on Hungary’s territory? Why was Italy tight-lipped?

Russia does not have to aim its missiles at European members of NATO. Why threaten them with tanks, bombers, or submarines if it has oil and gas pipelines? Russia is free to raise the price of oil or gas, oust a former chancellor from its huge market or offer him a good job, or promise something to the one in office. Bucharest demonstrated very clearly a victory of geoeconomics over geopolitics. Geoeconomic methods have already proven their short-term effectiveness. Will they ensure lasting security of glutted nations in the starving world?

Whatever European officials may say, Russia did gain an incredible position in Bucharest: now it has a vote and even the right of veto in an organization of which it is not a member! It is sure to use this right again and again, for appetite comes with eating…

A Trump Card from the Russian Sleeve

Long before the North Atlantic Alliance summit in Bucharest, the Kremlin spoke out its official opinion regarding Kyiv’s inspiration to join NATO: although the Russian Federation is against NATO’s expansion to the East, Ukraine is a sovereign state and has the right to choose its partners. In reality, Moscow, which participates in making some NATO decisions through Russia-NATO Council, is trying not to let Ukraine to join NATO.

During the parliamentary hearings in the Russian State Duma, the parliamentarians offered to denounce the agreement “On friendship, cooperation and partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation,” to introduce a visa regime for Ukrainians wishing to go to the Russian Federation and to block postal service in the event Ukraine joins the MAP. However, the fact that Italy, Greece Slovakia and many other courtiers are NATO members doesn’t prevent Russia from having agreements on friendship and cooperation with them and from the development of their intergovernmental relations.

Nevertheless, the Bucharest compromise is one more ground for the further worries of the Russian political elite. The head of the Russian representative office in NATO, Dmytriy Rogozin, is bothered about the proposed in the declaration formula “cooperation plus”: Kyiv and Tbilisi were not actually denied as they kept the right to receive an invitation to join the NATO Membership Action Plan in the future. Moreover, representatives of the Russian Foreign Policy Ministry announced that the decision on Ukraine and Georgia made in Bucharest was a great strategic mistake which would have grave consequences for the European security system. “Today, we practically have a document, in which it is stated that Ukraine and Georgia will become NATO members without asking their citizens,” said Russian diplomat Sergey Ryabkov.

Ukraine’s and Georgia’s membership in NATO (even in a long-term prospect) will not just upset the strategic balance in the world and the region but affect Russian geopolitical interests. The Russians think that this will push them out of those post-Soviet countries, which they traditionally consider their historic sphere of influence. In this case, Kyiv should expect tough economical, political and informational pressure from the Russian side. Just days before the summit, the Russian diplomats said that Russia had developed a plan of action in case Ukraine and Georgia join the MAP. We can now conjecture what trump cards the Kremlin has up its sleeve to hamper Ukraine’s joining the MAP.

Experts assume that during the next one to two months, Moscow will put political-psychological pressure upon Ukrainian authorities and business--and not only with the help of verbal announcements. For quite a long time now, Moscow has been warning us about the serious consequences of a cutback in Russian-Ukrainian cooperation in the military-industrial sphere. Additionally, it is obvious that the Kremlin will use the pro-Russian politicians and the hierarchs of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate to conduct active anti-NATO propaganda and hold mass protest activities in our country. Besides, the Russians will carry out a violent anti-NATO campaign in Ukrainian mass media.

The postponed decision on Ukraine joining the MAP is not good also because in a medium-term prospect, the Russians might use all their means and reserves (including the Black Sea fleet of the Russian Federation) to destabilize the situation in Ukraine and provoke new political crises. This will demonstrate to NATO that our country is not ready to work on NATO membership programs.

It looks like Russia won’t leave Ukraine alone until Ukraine becomes a NATO member. And we will be able to resist this pressure only if all Ukrainian political forces join their efforts in order to protect national interests and accept the principals of the civilized world as has happened with our Western neighbors.

A Sweetie in a Beautiful Wrap

Without what did NATO leave Ukraine in Bucharest?

Joining the MAP would have obliged Kyiv to conduct reforms in the economic, political, budget, military, law-making and law-enforcement spheres of the country in order to achieve the general standards and principals of the Trans-Atlantic community. It would have been better for Ukraine to start working in this direction as soon as possible – better for our security and well-being.

If Ukraine had been invited to join the MAP in Bucharest than Kyiv would have started the process of development and agreement with NATO International Secretariat of the annual NATO Membership Action Plan draft and we would have started to implement it by September 2008. However, the Bucharest decision means that at least till the end of this year, Kyiv will cooperate with the Alliance according to the old Ukraine-NATO Action Plan and Intensified Dialog regarding Ukraine’s aspirations to join NATO.

In December 2008, the heads of foreign policy departments of the Alliance member states will give their first estimate to the progress in Ukraine and Georgia. According to the 23rd point of the Bucharest Summit declaration, the foreign policy ministers “are authorized to make the decision on granting Ukraine and Georgia the Membership Action Plan.”

Theoretically, it is possible that they will make a decision that is positive for Ukraine. However, this might happen only if we are very lucky since even if our politicians start working hard to join the MAP, there is no guarantee that Paris and Berlin and their silent supporter will change their minds by December. We should take into consideration that winter is the period when the heating season starts, and Germany as well as many other NATO member states receive gas from Russia.

It is possible that the decision on granting Ukraine and Georgia the MAP will be made by the heads of the Alliance member states at the anniversary summit of NATO in April 2009. However, 2009 is the year when the presidential election campaign starts in Ukraine. That’s why the chances of achieving success are doubtful since, according to the last election experience, even the supporters of Euro-Atlantic integration do not like to raise this issue during election campaigns. Thus, it is more likely that the question about joining the MAP will be brought up only after the presidential elections. If, of course, it is brought up at all…

In this situation we should try to stay optimistic and hope for the best. However, if our country really wants to join NATO, then the members of our ruling coalition should stop arguing with each other about distribution of powers; the politicians from the “democratic coalition" should realize the importance of joining NATO; the President and the Prime Minister should keep within one consolidated position and speak out the same words in Moscow, Brussels, Washington and Berlin; our politicians should be strong enough to resist pressure from the Russian side; our country shouldn’t be shaken by political crises caused by the next early elections or new constitutional reform.