UKRAINIAN POLITICAL PARTIES. PART III. THE YULIYA TYMOSHENKO BLOC

The Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc

Create No Idol For Yourself

More than enough has been said and written about Yuliya Tymoshenko. But in fact, there is very little information about “the Dnipropetrovsk period” in the life of the future “gas baroness” and later, first lady of the national opposition. Besides, this information is far from indisputable, especially as its sources are mostly either various law enforcement bodies or circles close to the Presidential Administration as well as the leaders of leading business-political groups.

A graduate of Dnipropetrovsk University with a diploma in economics, Yuliya Tymoshenko worked at the Lenin Machine-Building Plant in Dnipropetrovsk from 1984 to 1989. From 1989 to 1991 she was the commercial director of the “Terminal” youth center. From the spring of 1991 to the fall of 1995 the would-be Vice Premier worked in the corporation “Ukrainsky Benzyn” [Ukrainian Gasoline], first as its commercial director, then as director general.

In November, 1995 Yuliya Tymoshenko came to head the corporation “Integrated Energy Systems of Ukraine” (IESU), behind which stood Pavlo Lazarenko whom Leonid Kuchma had just appointed First Vice Premier. In May 1996, Lazarenko took the top chair in the Cabinet, and in December the IESU head moved to Kiev. The businesswoman won the parliamentary elections in the Bobrynetsky constituency No. 229 (Kirovograd region) having collected a fantastic number of votes - 91.3%. In 1997, after her patron’s resignation, hard times befell the “Integrated Energy Systems”: according to press reports, the corporation was stripped of 26% of shares in the Khartsyzsky Pipe Factory, and its managers were landed with a $42 million-dollar debt to “Ukrgazprom”.

It is now that Tymoshenko (having relinquished her presidency in IESU after her election to Parliament) gets seriously involved in party affairs, actively trying to reanimate the “Hromada” [Ukrainian for “community”] political association set up in December 1993 but lying dormant since then. The association was set up by a group of politicians and entrepreneurs close to the “New Ukraine” liberal alliance. Olexandr Turchynov, relatively unknosw at that time was one of them. He was working as an adviser on economic matters to the then Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma and later to the Acting Premier Yefim Zvyagilsky. It was Turchynov who became the first leader of the party.

“Hromada” was a very strange organization, judging by its program. Its members described it as a party of influence the main principle of which was “No advertising” and the main commandment “Create no idol for yourself”. In 1997, “Hromada” resolutely abandons its main principle and embarks on intensive self-advertising. It becomes obvious that the organization (whose revival is initiated by Turchynov and Tymoshenko) is “campaigning”. According to well-informed sources, it was Tymoshenko who was supposed to take over “Hromada’s” reins from Turchynov. Tymoshenko (having gained publicity by then as an outspoken opposition politician) moves cautiously away from Lazarenko, apparently being aware of his imminent and inevitable crash. But it is Lazarenko, not Tymoshenko, who replaces Turchynov at the head of “Hromada’s” political-economic council in September of 1997.

At the 1998 elections the party collects 4.6751% of votes entitling it to 16 parliamentary seats. Another eight “Hromada” members win the election in the majority constituencies. Yuliya Tymoshenko was one of the latter, number 16 on the election roll, supported by 39% of voters in Constituency No. 99 (Kirovograd region). In May 1999 “Hromada” gets a 39-strong parliamentary faction registered. The faction includes such dissimilar politicians as Mikhail Brodsky, Leonid Kosakivsky, Yevgeniy Smirnov, Sergei Chukmasov, Viktor Shyshkin, Alexei Shekhovtsov. In July Tymoshenko heads the Parliamentary Budget Committee. She is moving further and further away from Lazarenko “sentenced” by the President. And her words are filled with less opposition rhetoric.

In September 1998, Yuliya Tymoshenko and her “right hand” Oleksandr Turchynov announce their withdrawal from “Hromada’s” leadership, explaining their move by Lazarenko’s “arbitrary methods of management”. In January 1999, they fulfill their promise. Evil tongues (perhaps, not just wagging) said the “schism” within “Hromada” was plotted by the Presidential Administration. In March 1999, the two withdraw from Lazarenko’s faction in Parliament and together with other ex-members of “Hromada” set up the “Batkivshchyna” [Motherland] faction (numbering 23 mps when registered). In May 1999, Tymoshenko and Turchynov give up their membership in a “politically stranded” “Hromada” and organize the All-Ukraine association “Batkivshchyna” in July.

Having dissociated herself from Lazarenko, Tymoshenko is granted access to the President; the press reports that IESU’s bank accounts have been unfrozen. And in December 1999 Tymoshenko becomes Vice Prime Minister in Yushchenko’s Cabinet. According to reliable sources, it was the new Premier’s personal deliberate choice: Yushchenko knew his future deputy well enough and valued her as a specialist - they had rubbed shoulders quite frequently as the NBU [National Bank of Ukraine] Governor and the Chairperson of the [Verkhovna Rada] Budget Committee. The President, as far as is known, was not so happy about her candidature, but he didn’t strongly object: Yushchenko had a free hand forming his “reformatory government”. But since her very first day in the Cabinet, Tymoshenko became an enemy to the leaders of all the oligarchic groups that “lived” on energy deals. The author of the “Energy Concept” and the “Clean energy” program introduced rigid mechanisms into the operation of the energy market. As a result, revenues to the budget increased and the shadow business of “energy kings” sustained serious losses. The President repeatedly expressed his dissatisfaction with Tymoshenko, but each time Yushchenko managed to save one of the most active members of his Cabinet. Yet, due to constant pressure from the oligarchs in his circles, the President pushed on.

On January 5, 2001 the Prosecutor General’s Office brings action against Yuliya Tymoshenko in two criminal cases. As a result, she is suspended from her job in the government within two weeks. After her dismissal the ex-Premier states that she was “sacked not by the President, but his criminal-oligarchic circles… The President’s environment uses him in its own interests… If only you knew how many times I’ve tried to convince him that he should rely on the government, not these guys…”

Already in late January Tymoshenko sets up a political organization designed to be a sort of joint chiefs of staff of the anti-Kuchma opposition. On February 9 the opponents of the incumbent government announce the creation of the “National Salvation Forum” [NSF]. Its objectives are to depose Kuchma, change the system of power and make Ukraine a parliamentary republic.

On February 13 Tymoshenko is arrested. The NSF members, who are still free, tie the move directly to the emergence of the Forum. After two weeks, the Pechersk District Court of Kiev annulles Tymoshenko’s arrest warrant as unlawful. Tymoshenko is released and taken to the “Medicom” hospital for in-patient treatment for acute stomach ulcer. Three days later, the Pechersk Court’s ruling is overruled by the Presidium of the Kiev City Court following a protest from the Prosecutor General’s Deputy. That very night Tymoshenko’s ward was taken under police guard. On April 2, 2001 the Supreme Court Chairman suspended the Kiev City Court Presidium’s verdict. That day policemen left their post at Tymoshenko’s ward.

In the spring of 2001, Tymoshenko initiates a national referendum on lack of confidence in the President. “Any further negotiations with the President are senseless,” she says adding that he is unable to behave morally. But the “Batkivshchyna” leader does not succeed with her initiative.

In May, a word is out that Yuliya Tymoshenko is going to set up an opposition election bloc.

The declaration on alignment was initially supported on July 10, 2001 by the leaders of seven parties - Yuliya Tymoshenko herself (“Batkivshchyna”), Levko Lukyanenko (“Ukrainian Republican Party”), Stepan Khmara (“Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party”), Anatoliy Matviyenko (“Sobor” Ukrainian People’s Party), Vasyl Onopenko (“Ukrainian Social-Democratic Party”) and Mykola Haber (“Patriotic Party”). Besides, “Batkivshchyna’s” press service announced that the Independent Coal-Miners Trade Union headed by Mykhailo Volynets would be the new election bloc’s ally. The question of who would lead it up to the elections wasn’t even discussed - no one questioned Tymoshenko’s role.

The bloc’s initial name was the “National Salvation Forum”. By that time the activity of opponents to the regime had stalled, but the names of the two most widely known anti-Kuchma organizations, the NSF and the “Ukraine Without Kuchma” movement were not yet forgotten. According to some sources, after brief consultations the opposition two leaders, Tymoshenko and Moroz, reached an amicable agreement on “political copyright”. “Ukraine Without Kuchma” became the trademark of the Socialist Party leader, and the “Batkivshchyna” leader got the copyright to the NSF brand. Besides, Moroz and Tymoshenko (who agreed to run the election race in separate lanes) signed a form of “non-aggression pact”.

“Our goal is 226 seats,” that is how the bloc’s leader “modestly” outlined the ultimate objective. (Later, one of her closest comrades-in-arms Levko Lukyanenko set the plank a bit lower - 40 mandates for the “listed” candidates). At the same time, she expressed a hope for the “Forum’s” possible alliance with Viktor Yushchenko’s nascent team: “Either peaceful coexistence during the election campaign and creation of a coalition in Parliament, or even joint work during the campaign. Our future cooperation is evident. We are the people who are carrying out a common program in this country, a common policy, we have the same ideals…”

Yushchenko made it clear more than once that an alliance with Tymoshenko was impossible. He kept insisting that he couldn’t be an opposition leader, that opposition is built on negation, that his bloc units creators, not destroyers, that he respected Yuliya Tymoshenko and her comrades, but “Our Ukraine” [election bloc led by Yushchenko] was a self-sufficient organization that needed no support from the regime’s opponents.

Nevertheless, on September 27, 2001 Tymoshenko made a last (and rather scandalous) attempt to persuade Yushchenko into “political cohabitation”. She wrote an open letter to the “Our Ukraine” leader in which she sharply criticized her former patron for his barefaced flirting with oligarchs and “court circle” parties. She demanded an immediate and clear answer: was he ready to unite his bloc with Tymoshenko’s bloc and Moroz’s Socialists into one team which (as the author of the message believes) “will win in the parliamentary elections and give power to honest politicians who are able to bring order to the country”.

Yushchenko (expressing careful surprise at the letter’s tone) refused again. Yet, there are grounds to say that Tymoshenko was satisfied with Yushchenko’s reply. Explaining her move, she said she wanted to make the pre-election negotiation process more transparent by pulling it out “from under the blanket”. But, apparently, she had some other reasons to take up her pen: she wanted to reveal Yushchenko’s proximity to the powers that be. By such a move the first lady of the opposition must have wanted to “win over” a number of voters who were critical of the President but ready to vote for “Our Ukraine”.

In October 2001 the NSF representatives made the first announcement of a possible change of its “signboard”. It was decided to put the leader’s name in the title. Levko Lukyanenko, the leader of the “URP” [Ukrainian Republican Party] that joined the “Forum” told reporters that the bloc’s representatives arrived at this conclusion after a series of sociological surveys… Many people know what the “NSF” is, but the name of Yuliya Tymoshenko is much better known in Ukraine”. Commenting on the event the leader of the “Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc” said that the change of the political surname was “not an expression of ambition but a personification of responsibility”.

On December 22, 2001 the bloc emerged. However, this time it united not seven, but four political organizations: “Batkivshchyna”, “Sobor”, Ukrainian Republican Party and Ukrainian Social-Democratic Party. Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party, Khmara and all, merged with Tymoshenko’s party, and Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party led by Oleksiy Serhiyenko was “absorbed” by Lukyanenko’s Republicans. “Patriot” Mykola Haber, together with his party, joined another bloc with the eloquent name “Against All”.

On January 5, 2002 the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc congress approved a list of 225 candidates to represent the bloc in the elections and a list of 57 politicians who the bloc intended to support in one-mandate constituencies. Named among them were the members of the current parliament Anatoliy Yermak, Zoreslava Romovska, Dmytro Chobit, Viktor Shyshkin, ex-MP Yuriy Hnatkevych, ex-Ambassador to Great Britain Serhiy Komissarenko, one of the organizers of the famous student hunger strikes in the early 1990’s Oles Doniy. The name of Volodymyr Oliynyk was neither on the “party” nor on the “one-mandate” list. His absence was explained by his withdrawal from the parliamentary election race and intention to concentrate on mayoral elections in Cherkasy.

Let us give a brief description of the parties that have formed the Yuliya Tymoshenko bloc. The basis, of course, is “Batkivshchyna”. Out of 195 “party-list candidtates”, 114 are, according to the Central election Committee, members of the party led by Yuliya Tymoshenko. According to data published on her personal web site, “Batkivshchyna” numbers 150,000 members, but other sources estimate its strength at about 50,000 members. “Batkivshchyna” runs 27 regional and 594 local organizations. Its faction in Parliament (according to the Verkhovna Rada’s official site) has 24 seats.

Another 26 candidates running in multi-mandate constituencies represent “Sobor”. It was founded on December 25, 1999 and registered by the Justice Ministry in March the following year. Anatoliy Matviyenko was elected its head, and his deputies were the former General Chief of Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Anatloiy Lopata, the regular fighter against the mafia Hryhoriy Omelchenko and the head of the “Soyuz Chornobyl” international organization, ex-MP Volodymyr Shovkoshytniy. The Chairman of the Council of Elders was one of the NSF leaders, Academician Kostyantyn Sytnyk. One of the“Sobor” members is Volodymyr Oliynyk, one of the founders of the “Kaniv Four” who ran for president in 1999.

“Sobor” is a centrist right opposition party whose representatives took an active part in the anti-Kuchma actions of 2000-2001. Its leaders were in the NSF and its representatives in Parliament were in the so-called “government lobby” that supported the Yushchenko Cabinet. At the peak of the “tape scandal” “Sobor” demanded the resignation of the President as well as the top law enforcement chiefs. According to official data, “Sobor” runs 23 regional and 10 grass-root organizations. It maintains contacts with a number of centrist right parties in Poland and Belarus. ZN has no information about its numerical strength. According to available information, “Sobor” enjoys strong support only in Kiev, Cherkasy and Podillia [mid-western region of Ukraine].

The Ukrainian Republican Party led by the patriarch of the national liberation movement Levko Lukyanenko is represented in the bloc by 16 members. URP became a successor to the famous Ukrainian Helsinki Group (the human rights organization founded in 1976) and was the first officially registered political party (1990). Lukyanenko ran in the 1991 presidential race and came in third with 4.49% of the votes. At the URP’s initiative, the Congress of National Democratic Forces was established in 1992. It was an indeterminate organization designed as an alternative to the People’s Rukh [movement] of Ukraine. It was actively supporting the then President Leonid Kravchuk. Ten members of the URP were elected to Parliament in 1994 (among them - Levko Lukyanenko, Roman Bezsmertny, the Presidential Representative in Parliament and Mykhailo Pavlovsky, now one of “Batkivshchyna’s” leaders. The Republicans were in the pro-presidential lobby in Parliament, which is proved, in particular, by their votes for the “Law on State Power” and the Constitutional Treaty [the compromise agreement between the President and Parliament]. At the 1998 parliamentary elections, the party (together with the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists and the UCRP) was in the “National Front” bloc allegedly initiated by the Presidential Administration.

The NF managed to collect only 2.717% of votes. Out of 168 candidates running in multi-mandate constituencies, only six gained parliamentary seats. In 1999, the URP joined the election bloc “Our President is Yevhen Marchuk!” and supported him actively in his election campaign.

The URP is a classic national-patriotic party that has changed recently from a pro-govenment into an opposition one. The best-known Republican is its leader Levko Lukyanenko, an active member of the NSF and number five on the Yuliya Tymoshenko bloc election roll. Within the bloc’s “quota”, the election roll has an entry for a well-known opposition fighter (former Rukhite and now non-partisan) Serhiy Holovatiy. According to available information, the party numbers under 10,000 members, its supporters being chiefly residents of Western Ukraine.

The fourth participant in the bloc, the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party, has delegated 34 candidates to the bloc’s election roll. But only two of them are in the top twenty. The USDP leader (the former leader of the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (United) now led by Viktor Medvedchuk), the ex-Justice Minister, MP Vasyl Onopenko is an honorable number four. In 1998, the USDP representatives allied with the Liberal Democrats in a bloc under the striking name “Ukraine’s European Choice” and suffered a serious defeat with a meager 0.1396% of votes collected. None of the 70 nominees from “UEC” won in multi-mandate constituencies. The future leader of the organization Vasyl Onopenko made it to Parliament as an SDPU(U) candidate. In 1999, USDP (together with URP) joined the bloc “Our President is Yevhen Marchuk!”. Along with that, Onopenko (who was elected the USDP Chairman in October, 1998) joined the presidential election race himself, this attempt hardly being called successful. He came in eighth among thirteen participants, one of the six outsiders who weren’t even able to collect 1% of the votes.

The bloc’s composition is varied: former functionaries, active opposition members, scientists, businessmen. Yet, very few of even the top twenty, let alone the 195 candidates on the election roll are likely to score substantial points for the bloc. Tymoshenko is, undoubtedly, the biggest magnet attracting votes, but it would be incorrect to say that all the votes are only for her.

Number five on the roll is “Sobor” leader Anatoliy Matviyenko. He demonstrated his talent of as a communist leader in 1989-1991 at high posts in “Komsomol” [The Young Communist League in the former USSR]. That did not prevent him from saying later that “communists are in power only where poverty reigns”. And when he left the National Democratic Party formed by himself, he called it at a news conference “a bubble that people don’t trust” and “the tragedy of my life”. His long rejection of Tymoshenko whom he called by a diminutive name at news conferences inquiring: “Who will go “under Tymoshenko”? I think many will choose not to go” finally ended in a surprising alliance.

Matviyenko can hardly count on any favors from the common voters in the Vinnytsya region who remember him as the governor under whom pension arrears alone exceeded UAH 100 million [almost $20 million], but local officials were forcibly recruited into NDP.

Nevertheless, there are Anatoliy Matvienko’s supporters too in his former constituency. Not the majority, but still a few. And there are Ukrainians who regard his leaving NDP as a courageous deed, who appreciate his giving up wealth and career for the sake of his principles. These supporters will be likely t o add to the votes collected by the bloc.

The third position is occupied by Hryhoriy Omelchenko. He, too, has supporters dispersed Ukraine-wide, with their highest concentration in the Poltava region. To the intelligent public, Hryhoriy Omelchenko is an irritating figure, but that doesn’t ever get in the way of his contact with audiences not familiar with the details of political machinations in the capital. In Tymoshenko’s election list the name of the man who has the image of a fighter against the mafia looks good. Perhaps his mission lies exactly in this rather than in collecting additional votes.

Vasyl Onopenko, the leader of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party, is a very interesting figure. This is the man who is really useful for the bloc. The former Justice Minister is still respected in the courts. He has many supporters in Central Ukraine. Besides, for some reason unknown to ZN, he has authority amongst the leaders of quite a few charismatic churches. Tymoshenko’s bloc is secretly supported by a number of parishes of the Moscow Patriarchate to which, she once donated substantial funds. Tymoshenko is a pious woman, especially lately. This has obviously been appreciated by the Kiev Patriarchate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. In several regions this church, too, prays for the bloc and its leader. However, the Orthodox church has a free membership, unlike many charismatic churches collecting membership fees. That’s why Vasyl Onopenko’s contact with the latter may well furnish hundreds of thousands of votes to the bloc.

Levko Lukyanenko and Stepan Khmara will contribute to the bloc passing the 4% barrier. These are two very different former dissidents who are still widely respected in the west of this country. During the previous election campaign, Lukyanenko’s popularity rating in the Ternopil region, for instance, reached 26%. It is highly likely that many of his and Khmara’s supporters might re-address their favor to the bloc.

Olexandr Turchynov in comfortable seventh position is a very special man. With his ultra-opposition views, he is in fact exceptionally well read and intelligent. The Chairman of the Parliamentary Budget Committee has the image of a strong organizer. Being Tymoshenko’s trustee, Turchynov who has been beside her for years must know her better than anyone else. He has never given her cause to question his loyalty. It doesn’t mean, however, that Turchynov follows obediently every whim of the bloc’s leader. He often has very heated arguments with Tymoshenko. Yet, he has her boundless trust and manages the bloc’s money. Turchynov has a good footing in the Dnipropetrovsk region and enjoys respect with the Baptists.

Mykhailo Pavlovsky is extremely active in campaigning. Earnest attempts to help the bloc are made by Serhiy Holovatiy who has supporters not only in his constituency in Kiev, but also throughout the capital and all large cities, among the public interested in the opposition movement. A reminder: that from the very first days after the disappearance of Georgiy Gongadze and beginning of the “tape scandal” Holovatiy took an active part in the investigation, for example in establishing the Melnychenko tapes’ authenticity in Germany, he met with Melnychenko and came up with a number of statements and conclusions, far from indisputable but very significant. Holovatiy is an experienced lawyer, the quality is much needed by the bloc.

A special place in the Yuliya Tymsohenko bloc is given to Petro Tolochko and Kostyantyn Sytnyk. Both are not “nouveaux” but real academicians. Tolochko has a great authority in conservative academic circles, and Sytnyk has the image of a revolutionary in science. The former Chairman of the Presidium of the supreme Council in the Soviet Ukraine demonstrated his ability to act resolutely not only in his struggle against conservative traditions within the National Science Academy. Together with Anatoliy Matviyenko he left NDP, and at the peak of the “tape scandal” it was in his, director’s, office in the Botany Institute where, among herbaria, the National Salvation Forum came into being. Perhaps, to a part of Ukrainian intelligentsia the names of two world-renowned scholars in the election list will be a kind of beacon.

But on the whole, the Yuliya Tymoshenko bloc list of candidates has practically no people able to more or less seriously share the campaigning expenses with Yuliya Tymoshenko. Nor does it have any administrative resources, if we don’t count the incumbent members of parliament.

Yuliya Tymoshenko loves: her mother, daughter, power, philosophy, difficult mathematical problems, sweet dishes, intricate business schemes, high-heeled shoes, money, carrot juice, theatrical performance, loyal people, pathetic speeches, morning jogging, talking about her presidency, to listen attentively, to act her own way, to set unrealistic tasks, to fulfill them by all means, to wear expensive clothes and a minimum of makeup.

Yuliya Tymoshenko hates: to give up, to admit her mistakes, to use foul language, to gossip, Kuchma, Lazarenko, Medvedchuk, inaction, American capital, whining, Russian capital, dieting, talking about her private life.

Tymoshenko is unique in her own way. The Lord seems to have granted her several live, not only political and economic, but also physical ones. But, on the other hand, she has gone through more than enough ordeals. Not so much through God’s designs as the results of her own actions. One can’t but note, however, that practically in any situation, whatever height Tymoshenko may fall from, she always falls “on all fours” and moves upward again.

Mrs. Tymoshenko is not simple. For all her superficial openness, her clear and categorical utterances, she is a closed woman. She will never say one word more than necessary, especially about herself. She does not go in for revelations in public. Anyone who knows her well enough is convinced that she has a goal. Some believe that it is money, some are convinced that the cherished destination of her crooked path is power and the presidency, others believe in the honesty of her aspirations - to radically change life in this country. We can’t give a definite answer, either, but we should note that Tymoshenko moves toward her goal stubbornly, making and at times ignoring sacrifices.

The leader of the election bloc is a typical representative of the Dnipropetrovsk school. Keeping the eye fixed on the target, these people can change course, stoop to deals with their enemies on unfavorable terms, ingratiate themselves, betray, but move on to the target. Now add to all this her confidence in her feminine charms and her talent as an actress. Even as a woman Tymoshenko may have very different ways. Rem Vyakhirev and Viktor Chernomyrdin just could not say no to the pretty little lady looking out of mink furs and lacy ruffles who asked them for [increased] quotas of natural gas supplies. She looked insulted and stern during her live TV debate with Hryhoriy Surkis. She is all inflexibility, fidelity and adherence to principles when she talks about her political position and criticizes the present regime. Those who have happened to be in her home know that no granny can treat her children with delicious treats so caringly and insistently as she treats her guests.

Many call Tymoshenko an “iron lady”. That’s more true than not. But she can be defenseless and lonely, too. Still, such a state caused by extreme circumstances, like prison, for instance, does not keep her down long. She braces herself up very quickly and starts acting. Action is her normal condition.

At the beginning of her economic and political career, any underestimated Tymoshenko, she was taken for a naive girl who decorated a big corporation. Those many got their fingers burned later. Tymoshenko is effective enough as an economist and politician, which she actually proved when she was the Vice Premier in charge of the fuel and energy sector. There is no doubt, that she was the locomotive of reforms and innovations in the energy sector. The new law on the energy market, the termination of barter deals and mutual settlements - all these were based on Tymoshenko’s proposals.

However strange it may seem, Tymoshenko is not afraid to be left moneyless. And not because she has considerable savings. After the arrest of her accounts in foreign banks, the murder of the “Slovyansky” bank, the pogrom of the IESU and the expropriation of her property in Ukraine by the collective effort of the oligarchs, one can hardly talk of her large financial wealth. But for the present period Tymoshenko has determined the priorities for herself - political survival and the continued struggle for her place and her ideas in politics and economics. As far as we know, Tymoshenko is not actively engaged in business, but she is firmly convinced that her main capital - her brains - will remain in place, no matter if she makes it to Parliament or not. It looks like Tymoshenko is sure that as soon as it becomes necessary, she can restore her position in business very quickly.

Her second opposition venture deserves special attention. As is known, she undertook the first one when the empire built by Lazarenko and his satellites was falling apart. Tymoshenko fought then for her own and nothing but her own wealth. It was followed by her reconciliation with the President and the non-aggression pact which both sides breached a little here and there. While occupying the post of Vice Premier, she had no opportunities to use the available levers to her own benefit. But working on state affairs, she making more and more enemies who finally managed to get her charged with felony, sacked and arrested.

Anticipating those events, Tymoshenko, while still at her post, made a series of opposition-minded political statements. This time she was defending not only her own interests. The significance of this step cannot be overestimated, because in the midst of the “tape scandal” it was extremely important to hear how it was all judged by a successful politician and entrepreneur rather than the traditional poor opposition fighters who were regarded by many as losers. Tymoshenko’s money and passionate manner sufficed to set up the National Salvation Forum. But they were not enough for a victory. She exerted huge efforts to save its members from enmity amidst their claims for leadership.

We know how it all ended. Yet, against the background of Yushchenko’s camouflage, Tymoshenko earned favor with a large number of Ukrainians as a staunch opposition fighter. But she failed to break in time and skidded too far to the extreme wing of Ukrainian opposition. The event that established this status was her idea to hold a national referendum on Kuchma’s pre-term resignation. The scandal had abated by that time, and the central TV channels kept showing the same old materials about the charges brought against Tymoshenko. The authorities achieved their purpose. Today, Tymoshenko is the best-known politician after Kuchma: 54% don’t trust her at all, and about 8% trust her completely. That’s why 60% of Ukrainians, according to opinion polls, who had supported the idea of Kuchma’s pre-term resignation did not support her initiative. The idea of the referendum gradually dwindled away.

But Tymoshenko does not give up. She hopes to win in the elections and leave a still more impressive trace on history. Mrs. Tymoshenko wants to be President, and no one has been able so far to dissuade her. She is skeptical about the idea of making amendments to the Constitution that would reduce the scope of presidential authority. Tymoshenko is against the election of governors saying that a unitary system is the only right one for Ukraine. She is convinced that a man with enough authority who knows how the country should be changed will be an efficient and useful manager of the state. Tymoshenko trusts in the adequacy of this post. Observers warn, however, that such a willful type as Tymoshenko must never be granted virtually unlimited powers. A completely different situation would be to work under control where her knowledge and experience in economic management are used in the best way while certain restrictions do not allow her to abuse this position.

The forces concentrated now around Tymoshenko and Moroz have every right to be called an opposition. In essence, not in form. To bereave the parliament of the opposition would mean to brake the none too fast development of the state and society. So a possible defeat of Tymoshenko and her bloc in the forthcoming elections will be a heavier loss to the country than to the leader of the election bloc. After all, she has more lives in reserve.

As mentioned above, on January 5, 2001 the Prosecutor general’s office of Ukraine officially brought criminal charges against Tymoshenko. One criminal case was filed on grounds of “falsification of documents and smuggling of Russian natural gas in 1996 in amounts equal to 3 billion cubic meters worth UAH 445 million [equal to $227 million in 1996]”. The PGO indicted the “IESU” corporation of illegal customs registration of imported natural gas allegedly supplied by the British company “United Energy Ltd.”. As a result, large sums in hard currency were transferred to its bank account. During several years, according to Deputy Prosecutor General Mykola Obikhod, “IESU” transferred a total of $700 million to “United Energy Ltd.” as payment for natural gas. Besides, Obikhod charged, “IESU” transferred, without any substantiation, large amounts to the account of another British company - “Corlan Enterprises Ltd.”. “As a result of that illegal transaction, a total of $1.1 billion was exported from Ukraine”, - Potebenko’s deputy disclosed.

The second criminal case was filed on the grounds of Tymoshenko’s tax evasion to the amount of $149,000. The PGO derived this conclusion from documents allegedly proving that Tymoshenko and her husband, having founded “Somoli Enterprises Ltd.” in Cyprus, received a $1 million profit. The money was transferred, according to the PGO, to the Russian “Inkombank” and “hidden away” from Ukrainian taxation bodies. The charges brought against Tymoshenko were “worth” 10 years in prison with a possible confiscation of the property.

On February 3, 2001 the Chief Investigator of the State Tax Administration Svyatoslav Piskun announced that $1.21 billion was illegally transferred through the “Slovyansky” bank, of which some $1 billion allegedly belonged to “IESU”. General Piskun accused not only Pavlo Lazarenko, Petro Kyrychenko and Boris Feldman, but also Yuliya Tymoshenko saying “her involvement in the criminal activity of “Slovyansky” has been uncovered”.

On February 6 Mykola Obikhod produced another sensation: according to him, the PGO had grounds to suspect Yuliya Tymoshenko and Pavlo Lazarenko of planning the “tape scandal”.

In a week Tymoshenko was arrested. We have described those events above. There is one more thing: on April 12, 2001 Supreme Court Chairman Vitaliy Boiko entered a protest to the Supreme Court Collegium demanding the repeal of the February 30, 2001verdict passed by the Kiev City Court and uphold the February 27, 2001 verdict passed by the Pechersk District Court which ruled Tymoshenko’s arrest as unlawful. On May 15, 2001 the Supreme Court Collegium for Criminal Cases uphold the protest.

We should also remember that on August 18, 2000 the prosecutor General’s Office detained, and in three days arrested “IESU” Vice President Olexandr Tymoshenko (Yuliya Tymoshenko’s husband) and the First Deputy of “IESU” Director General Valeriy Falkovich. On August 9, 2001 the Kievo-Svyatoshinsky Court ruled the Prosecutor General’s action to prolong the term of O.Tymoshenko’s and V.Falkovich’s arrest as unlawful, after which both were released. On October 3, 2001 the Kiev Region Court of Appeal left the appeal lodged by the PGO without satisfaction. The same happened to the cassation lodged by the Deputy Prosecutor General when it was considered by the Supreme Court Collegium.

On February 3, 2001 the PGO detained and in three days arrested “IESU” Deputy Director General Petro Prystromko. On March 29, 2001 the Pechersk District Court of Kiev ruled the arrest warrant as unlawful and annulled it. That resolution by the Pechersk District Court was not objected by the PGO.

On September 3, 2001 the Deputy Chief of the PGO Special Investigative Department closed the smuggling attempt cases of Yuliya Tymoshenko and Olexandr Tymoshenko for “the absence of corpus delicti” in their actions.

Yuliya Tymoshenko, on her part, sued the PGO for unlawful institution of criminal proceedings against her; she sued the President for his decree to dismiss her from the post of Vice Premier (in what concerned the formulation of reasons for her dismissal); and she sued the Parliament for its unlawful resolution to suspend her mandate.

The Supreme Court of Ukraine will shortly consider the case of all criminal proceedings against Yuliya Tymoshenko which restricted her status as a people’s representative. Earlier, the Pechersk District Court reinstated Tymoshenko’s rights as a people’s representative. But on January 29 the Kiev Court of Appeals satisfied the PGO’s protest and repealed the resolution ruling that the Pechersk District Court had exceeded its competence. Tymoshenko was not present at the Court because of a road accident on her way there after which she was taken to hospital. Thus, the ban on travel was imposed on Tymoshenko again. Nevertheless, last week she announced her intention to resume her electioneering tours on February 25. Tymoshenko hinted that even before the weekend the Supreme Court would set her “free to travel” again: “I won’t break the law… I will go only when it is allowed. I just think everything will be okay…”

Yuliya Tymoshenko’s first trip in twelve months was to the west. The bloc’s leader was accompanied by Levko Lukyanenko and Stepan Khmara. The predictably loyal West received the guests very warmly. Lviv, Chernivtsi, Ternopil and other cities and villages met the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc representatives with prepared and improvised rallies. The short period of freedom to travel was interrupted by the Kiev City Court’s resolution and the car accident in downtown Kiev. Brain concussion and hemorrhage, strained neck bone ligaments - a sad result of the collision of Tymoshenko’s armored Mercedes and an old Zhiguli. The recommendations by doctors at the “government” hospital didn’t differ from what independent therapists advised: a month in bed after discharge from hospital. Nevertheless, if the Supreme Court passes a positive decision, Yuliya Tymoshenko will make a trip to the east, most probably to Kharkiv.

In the Kharkiv region there are 10,000 members of the parties that are in the Yuliya Tymoshenko bloc, 4,000 of them being members of “Sobor”, which has 38 grass-root organizations. The composition and structure of “Batkivshchyna’s” regional branch and its members are not widely advertised. The Chairman of the regional organization Alexander Surin says it is better this way: “We have to live surrounded by enemies”.

In the Kharkiv region the bloc is supported by the regional branch of “Prosvita” [enlightenment] and representatives of the “For Truth” public committee. A youth office of the Yuliya Tymoshenko bloc has been set up. According to the bloc’s regional election HQ, up to 70,000 residents of the Kharkiv region support the bloc. As in most other regions, the bloc’s members were registered as non-partisan candidates in multi-mandate constituencies, basically by way of self-nomination. According to their Headquarters, it is a tactical move to lower the pressure during the campaign.

The bloc doesn’t have its own press in the region. “Sobor’s” newspaper hasn’t been published for six months - there is no money. The local mass media don’t treat the “YuTB” too well. Recently, members of parliament Anatoliy Matvienko and Hryhoriy Omelchenko booked air time on the regional TV and paid for it, but they couldn’t even enter the building of the TV center - they were not admitted.

The members of Tymoshenko’s bloc take an active part in protest actions, although they could hardly be called massive. The latest picketing of the Regional Administration was staged last week by the “YuTB” Kharkiv Youth Office and the committee “For Truth”. They protested against the regional authorities who used their administrative levers to force people to vote for the “power party”.

Volodymyr Bakumenko who heads the election headquarters says: “The interest in the bloc on the part of budget-financed employees has grown of late. It could be a form of protest against pressure from the authorities on budget-funded organizations”.

Dnipropetrovsk is Tymoshenko’s home, her bloc members being represented in 16 out of 17 constituency commissions there.

Five candidates are running for parliament in multi-mandate constituencies. In constituency No.25 Volodymyr Tsapenko, a member of “Sobor”, stands minimal chances of defeating the member of the current parliament Olexandr Ryabchenko or Deputy Governor Sergey Bychkov.

There is the same situation in constituency No.26 where URP member Yevhen Shevchenko will compete with Viktor Pinchuk from “Labor Ukraine”. Editor-in-Chief of the “Tochka Zoru” [point of view] newspaper Natalia Sokurenko who is known to be close to Natalia Vitrenko [leader of the Progressive Socialist Party] is a noticeable figure in Kryviy Rih. It makes it all the more surprising that she is now a member of “Sobor” and is running “under the umbrella” of the Yuliya Tymoshenko bloc in constituency No.31. Registered in the same constituency is Volodymyr Movchan, the Board Chairman of the “Central Ore-Concentrating Mill” holding company, a member of the Popular Democratic Party. Knowing Natalia Sokurenko’s character, we can’t exclude the possibility of thoroughly documented materials compromising her main rival appearing in the pages of her newspaper.

Another candidate nominated by the [pro-presidential election bloc] “For United Ukraine”, Director General of the “SevGok” [Northern Ore-Concentrating Mill] holding company Mykola Kolesnyk will have to compete for Kryviy Rih voters with a member of “Batkivshchyna”, the chairman of its regional organization Serhiy Orel. Of course, the “Point of View” held by N.Sokurenko will support her colleague. And, finally, running in “Lazarenko’s” constituency No.40 is a member of the current parliament Dmytro Chobit. His rivals in the constituency are MP Sergey Chukmasov and Chairman of the SDPU(U) regional organization, Dnipropetrovsk Vice Mayor Gennadiy Gvozdev. Constituency N.40 is believed to be one of the most difficult since it covers five administrative districts of the region. Local analysts say that non-partisan candidates have practically no chances in the Dnipropetrovsk region.

What is characteristic about the Yuliya Tymoshenko bloc during this election campaign is its almost complete media isolation in provinces. That’s why its regional office stage-managed occasions of interest to be covered by the press and TV. In January, for instance, it arranged a meeting between mass media representatives and Valeriy Ivasyuk who disclosed “sensational details of the investigation in the Gongadze case”. The same scenario was followed at a news conference with Stepan Khmara who commented on the death of Vyacheslav Chornovil and Dmytro Chobit who presented his “Narcissus” [documentary book disclosing some facts of SDPU(U) leader Medvedchuk’s biography].

As for the bloc’s popularity rating, as of February 19, according to the Dnipropetrovsk Regional Office of the “Committee of Ukrainian Voters”, it stood at 3.6%.

When the bloc was formed in the Lviv region, there were some conflicts between “Batkivshchyna” and URP that left visible traces. In the same constituency No.119, the rivals are the “partners-in-bloc” Zoreslava Romovska (Head of “Batkivshchyna’s” Lviv Regional Office) and Iryna Lukavetska (URP member, self-nominated).

The bloc may well experience another period of conflicts at the local level: the point of discord may be the difference of views on mayoral elections in Lviv. The Yuliya Tymoshenko bloc officially supports Lyubomyr Bunyak. URP has favored Fedoryshyn until recently. A future collision is likely to be caused by Bunyak’s very friendly relationship with Governor Mykhailo Hladiy, his partner in the “For a United Ukraine”. (Kuybida is very inconvenient to Hladiy, as with any other governor appointed by the President, because he acts independently, not as ordered by the regional authority). Bunyak has the broadest possible access to all types of state-owned mass media, both regional and nationwide. Some even maintain that Bunyak was supposed to run for Lviv Mayor as a “FIU” candidate, but chose not to do it, because the pro-presidential bloc’s rating in Lviv was not high enough for serious competition. That was allegedly why Bunyak was “tied” to Tymoshenko’s bloc. Its members who identify themselves as the real opposition to the regime may take this situation sensitively. Several clever heads already suspect that the Presidential Administration holds a controlling influence over Tymoshenko’s bloc. Whether it is so or not, this situation needs to be explained and clarified by the Yuliya Tymoshenko bloc leader.

“Batkivshchyna” does not possess administrative resources. Its financial resources were described by the Lviv Office like this: “There’s never too much funding, but we try to cover our expenses the best way we can. We’d like to do it better, but…”. The Lviv Office counts on increased assistance from individual sponsors in the future as its rating grows. Also, “friendship with Budnyak” could be listed among the bloc’s financial and administrative resources in the Lviv region, too. This candidate for the Mayor’s seat is backed by the powerful gas exporting company “Druzhba” [friendship].

The HQ staff say that “Batkivshchyna” is very well structured and represented throughout Ukraine. But, according to neutral observers, the structures of this party are inferior in quality to those of URP. The Ukrainian Republican Party that has been functioning for more than ten years has a developed structure. As its representatives say, its organizations cover “80 per cent of the region”. URP can send its observers to polling stations; it can work as united team during the elections. The “minus” of URP’s resources is that its people are poorly adapted to the new conditions of campaigning work - they mostly “have the 1998 elections way of thinking”.

Tymoshenko is on friendly terms with Taras Chornovil, Taras Stetskiv, “Nova Khvylya” [new wave], “The Lviv Region Student Brotherhood” (who support Bunyak). It’s possible that UNA-UNSO [ultra-rightist nationalist organization] will also beef up the bloc’s campaigning force with its young men.

A printing house in Lviv has published a special edition of the “Patriot Ukrainy” newspaper (600,000 circ.). From pages 2 to 13 there is “The Voter’s Ukrainian Alphabet”. There are also “The Ten Commandments of a Voter”, “The Ten Commandments of a TV Viewer” and some materials which substantiate Ukrainian society’s readiness to accept a woman as the nation’s leader(!).

Without any great effort, the Yuliya Tymoshenko bloc Lviv Office publishes its promotional materials in Lviv’s and West Ukraine’s largest-circulation papers, “Vysokiy Zamok” [high castle] and “Express”.

In Lviv Tymoshenko takes votes from the “Our Ukraine” bloc: those who haven’t lived to see Yushchenko’s action of opposition are joining the banners of Tymoshenko’s bloc. And there are a lot of such people in West Ukraine.

…With as many as three candidates out the top twenty on the bloc’s election roll running in the Vinnytsia region, that region ought to be taken as its key one. The real situation, however, looks more like a military inspection of the lineup, when only sound tanks are shown and all the scrap is left in hangars.

USDP leader Vasyl Onopenko (No.4 on the list) was only born in the Vinnytsia region. Anatoliy Matviyenko (No.2) and Oleg Yukhnovsky (No.19) have easily surrendered their multi-mandate constituency, without even leaving successors. The situation with the other echelons is no better - there is simply not a single more or less popular figure there. So Matviyenko’s statement at a “Sobor” conference last November on his party’s intention to bring at least 30% of its members to bodies of local self-government was, in fact, nothing more than a wishful thinking.

Actually, the whole promotional campaign waged by the “YuTB” in the Vinnytsia region consists in reprinting (not just for a kind word, of course) ideological articles from the “VV” [“Vecherniye Vesti” - evening news - national daily] in one of the largest-circulation local newspapers “Channel 33”. It’s rather strange for a party that doesn’t starve financially. Where does Lady Yu’s money go? - is a good question. It’s quite possible that this question is directly connected with the assault on the funds administrator in the region Mr.Pastushenko who is now in hospital with a serious skull trauma.

And the bloc has neither “political investors’ nor administrative resources in the Vinnytsya region. Those who used to fund the pro-authority party when Matvyienko was Governor are still there as a business nomenclature. Someone could put an egg or two in the bloc’s basket, but does not yet have enough courage.

In the Kherson region Tymoshenko’s bloc has organizations representing four parties: URP (360 members), “Sobor” (about 300), USDP (a score or two members) and “Batkivshchyna”, the most numerous of all, with over 3,000 members. The bloc’s rating is not high - 0.55% to 2%, according to various polls. The bloc itself estimates it to be much higher - up to 5%. The election HQ staff are sure that the bloc will pass the 4% barrier in the region. In all multi-mandate constituencies the bloc’s candidates have been registered as self-nominees.

Before the 1998 elections, “Batkivshchyna” had been advertised well in Kherson, and its representative Yelyashkevych was elected to Parliament in one of the constituencies. Then dissention and discord shattered the party, its ranks were abandoned by many of those who had stood at its cradle. For example, Olexandr Maksymenko, the former leader. He withdrew from the party. Now he chairs the election commission in constituency No.183. Olexandr Melnykov, the former [Communist] party functionary, then a member of “Hromada”, is now the Governor’s adviser.

“Batkivshchyna’s” current leader in the region is Petro Makushev, 42,aA lawyer by profession, his last job being the International Business Institute, a private establishment. Unemployed since last summer. He submitted false information about his job which served as grounds to deny his registration as a candidate. When he corrected his CV, he was registered, but he still passes off the first denial as political persecution. There is one more questionable act on his record. On February 11 he submitted the following request to the constituency commission: “I request to cancel my appearances on TV and radio because of my refusal and to transfer the money allotted for the appearances to b/a #...” Further goes the number of a bank account with Makushev’s signature. One hour before the commission met, the request was withdrawn - most probably, at the demand of an emissary from Kiev.

Tymoshenko’s bloc could have very good chances in Donetsk, because coal-miners valued highly the results of her vice-premiership. Money in the pocket is a weighty argument. But there are some problems in her relations with the regional leadership of “Batkivshchyna”. According to the election HQ, the chief of the regional office demanded $150,000 for the purchase of a printing office. The money was not provided. The chief moved to the “FIU”. The Kiev office is happy that he left without a printing office. But even the present leadership is influenced more by the “FIU” than by the “YuTB”. The relationships with the independent trade union [of coal-miners] led by Volynets were very promising. Its members took the unprecedented step of joining Tymoshenko’s party. The “Batkivshchyna” leadership promised them to support their candidates for seats in local councils, but its regional office nominated its own candidates without talking to Volynets and his team. The conflict has seriously weakened the bloc’s positions in a region known for strong its administrative resources.

To get 4% we have to take 7% - this is the target set by the election headquarters. It is explained by the following: whereas during the 1998 elections the “Labor Ukraine” and Agrarian Party became donors for other parties, this time Tymoshenko’s and Moroz’s teams have certain reasons to expect that when the ballot slips are counted in 2002, it will be their political associations which the authorities will try to make donors. Members of Tymoshenko’s bloc, and not only they contend that governors have received a clear directive: the region where the bloc passes the 4% barriers will have a new governor. The authorities and competitors who control TV channels are holding a very effective blockade of the “YuTB”. Not a single promotional reel has appeared on the central channels so far. Serhiy Holovatiy and Anatoliy Matviyenko who are responsible for the negotiations and arrangements have not managed to meet with the management of most TV channels. However, the blockade has become so conspicuous for observers that a few appearances on “1+1” or even “Inter” can’t be ruled out altogether.

There are some other methods used against the bloc. The “Presa Ukrainy” [central publishing house] refused to print the “VV” newspaper which is very close to Yuliya Tymoshenko, for an alleged overflow of orders. The same reason was given to the “Slovo Batkivshchyny” [Fatherland’s Word]. For the same reason these newspapers were denied circulation on subscription Ukraine-wide. In some regional offices of “Ukrposhta” [Ukrainian postal service], though, the newspapers that promote the bloc can still be subscribed.

The majority of mass media refuse the Yuliya Tymoshenko bloc placement of its promotional materials. Nor can it count on any opportunities to respond to criticisms and explain its point of view to voters. The attempts to use the Parliament’s mouthpiece “Holos Ukrainy” [Voice of Ukraine] are equally unsuccessful. Its Editor-in-Chief Serhiy Pravdenko is in the top ten on the election roll. But a sudden checkup of “misappropriation of budget funds by the editorial office” sharply cut Pravdenko’s capacities and limited his freedom. In a number of the regional and central mass media - the “Silski Visti” [Countryside News] newspaper, for instance - the bloc has a prepaid supplementary sheet where it normally publishes its own “live” articles, i.e. without editorial cuts. Dozens of thousands of sticker posters already flash in cities and villages, and the bulk of the printing matter is kept in store waiting for its time. But one shouldn’t expect all this to make a revolution, because voters’ attitude to leaflets and posters as a kind of advertisement is the most skeptical.

A great effect was produced by the book “Order Not Performed” written by Yuriy Rogoza . Utterly primitive in the eyes of the “aesthetic” public, but very impressive to the narrow-minded average layer of the society. As ratings show, there is an abundance of such “soap” in this country. That’s why the book has been republished several times.

Gourmets of philosophy and economics will have to wait untill the elections for the publication of a treatise co-authored by Tymoshenko and Russian technologists Kazbek Biktursunov the onetime second man in Vladimir Putin’s election team in Kalmykia.

There is one more “bestseller”, though, which observers list among the bloc’s campaigning techniques. It is Dmytro Chobit’s book about Viktor Medvedchuk titled “Narcissus”. Technically, the book is not effective. Firstly, because unlike the “Order Not Performed”, it reads badly. Secondly, because the paths of those voters who are going to vote for [Medvedchuk’s] SDPU(U) and those who support the Yuliya Tymoshenko bloc do not cross anywhere. Factually, “Narciss” does contain a good deal of true facts from Medvedchuk’s biography. But there are lots of incorrect facts and distortions, too. And on a human aspect the book is beneath all criticism.

The same is the case in the moves taken by Medvedchuk and Pinchuk against Tymoshenko. Mr. Chobit is a member of the “Batkivshchyna” faction in Parliament. Some sources, close to Tymoshenko’s campaigning team, believe that the book’s publication was financed by Tymoshenko. She refutes it categorically in private conversations and even talks about her conflict with Chobit over the book, because of which he lost his 16 place in the election list shortly before the party congress. This is the third time Dmytro Chobithas run for parliament in a Dnipropetrovsk constituency. The first two attempts were successful.

The current election campaign owes Tymoshenko a great deal for such an innovation in the enlightenment of Ukrainian voters as live TV debates. Her faction drafted and the Parliament passed in December the law on compulsory debates between candidates on all national TV channels. It was vetoed by the President, but Tymoshenko didn’t give up and publicly challenged Medvedchuk. Their conversation on Radio Liberty left an ambiguous impression. But afterwards, Medvedchuk refused to face Tymoshenko on TV. Now, pressured by the opposition, the West and the “third sector”, some TV channels are going to stage something like debates. All the runners in the race will be presented only on STB. A part will get air time on ICTV and “1+1”, the mouthpieces of the “FIU” bloc and SDPU(U) respectively. Notably, in both cases Tymoshenko’s opponent in debates (chosen not by open casting of lots, of course) would be the leader of Progressive Socialists Natalia Vitrenko. The purpose of such “mating” is obvious. But let’s go back to the bloc’s technologies.

The bloc or, to be more precise, Yuliya Tymoshenko has a personal site on the Internet. For a while it used to enjoy the biggest political success in Ukraine. But several hundred questions to the bloc’s leader that were not answered diverted the Internet public’s interest from Tymoshenko’s site to those of SDPU(U) and “Our Ukraine”.

Just as some of her rivals do, Tymoshenko tries to find a way to the heart and mind of each voter. A significant number of people have received by mail pathetically touching letters addressed personally to them. Teenage fans, too, make some contribution to the bloc’s campaign. The bloc’s logo and slogan “Exit Exists” are sprayed on walls in some cities. Rear windows of cars traveling across the country are covered in Tymoshenko’s portraits.

The bloc plans to organize an alternative counting of votes. To do this work where everyone has failed so far, it has invited the Socialist Party. According to election headquarters, Yushchenko and the “Yabluko” [apple] party have agreed to participate. The latter, by the way, is also afraid to become a donor for more powerful parties. In order to materialize this technology, the bloc nominated its candidates in many multi-mandate constituencies counting on more quotas in their commissions and in the team of observers. Well-informed sources allege the bloc’s involvement in the creation of three subjects of the election process, of which only two have received this status - “Women for Children’s Future”, renamed into “The New World” and the bloc “Against All”. The bloc “For Leonid Kuchma” wasn’t registered. That would have been amusing!

An alternative counting of votes is supposed to be carried out in Kiev where data from all constituencies would be transferred via a multi-channel “hot line” by observers from all the above-mentioned parties. Under the election law, they must be provided with the original protocols on the voters’ turnout and on returns of the voting. The bloc’s leadership is optimistic that this system will work well. The bloc’s technologists are skeptical. The problem is, URP’s and “Sobor’s” representative capacities are very limited. “Batkivshchyna’s” diaspora is not the best basis for accurate and well-organized work. It’s no secret that the primary purpose of the representatives of most parties in their central and regional offices is to earn some good money on the back of elections rather than promote a candidate. If it weren’t for the Russian technologists employed by the “power parties”, the system designed to uphold “Batkivshchyna’s” interests could be called a champion at swindling its own leadership. Tymoshenko is not that easy to cheat, but she wants to be deceived: she won’t be able to stand confrontation at the center.

The efficiency of the bulk of regional offices inevitably isto zero, but their funding can’t be cut, because some regional leaders threaten to step out against the central leadership if their “rations” are cut. The exceptions are the Kiev, Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovograd and a couple of other regional offices. Against a background of low efficiency of the official organisations, the self-organized ones are performing not too bad. Many ZN correspondents observe that Tymoshenko’s supporters are notably outspoken and clear, but these qualities will hardly be enough for efficient team-work on the night of March 31.

The current sociological forecasts for the bloc are 2.5% - 3.8% on average. According to data from the Razumkov Center of Economic and Political Studies, its rating stands at 3.5% (3.3% in the South, 3.4% in Central Ukraine, 6.6% in the West, 2.2% in the East). The members of the bloc are convinced that at least 2% are still unrevealed, because some voters are afraid to disclose their positive attitude to Tymoshenko’s bloc even during a sociological poll.

“The returns of these elections will be surprising to many”, - predicts the leader of the bloc. We should agree with her about this and wish her block good luck.

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