Country and citizens: awkward age
Teenagers are totally unpredictable: now laughing, then crying; now wishing to be an astronaut and then a banker; now flattering, then insulting. So is Ukraine, just turning fifteen. Its citizens are dazed and confused, unable to distinguish old thieves from new statesmen. Their leader was the President. Now the country is ruled by the Premier. Some citizens have had nervous breakdowns because of politics, even though everybody is supposed to be happy now that the President has declared the country’s reunion.
Alas, he is hardly able to help Ukrainians live and feel as one nation under God. There are two reasons. First, citizens are normally united by equal rights and responsibilities before the law. It is any political leadership’s duty to ensure such equality. The leadership headed by Viktor Yushchenko is unable to do this. Second, the Ukrainians are diverse, and the differences that divide them lie far deeper than grass roots.
The sociological service of the Razumkov Center has traditionally polled adult Ukrainians on the eve of Independence Day to find out their attitude to Ukraine’s independence and to independence anniversary celebrations.
Independence with New Leadership
The victory of freedom consolidated our independence and reaffirmed the choice we made in 1991. This year, for the first time in fourteen years, the majority of our citizens called this country truly independent.
V. Yushchenko. August 24, 2005
The majority of respondents said they valued Ukraine’s independence. Notably, their number has not changed since last year’s poll, although so many things have changed in this country.
Last year, 60% of respondents spoke for independence. This year the figure is 59%. 20% of respondents in both polls were against it, and 21% said they would ignore a referendum on independence, should it be announced now.
This year’s poll showed two significant differences. The first one is a higher level of awareness of personal gains/losses after independence: last year 28% of respondents said they had gained from independence, 37% said they had lost, and 35% were undecided. This time, 27% believe that independence has benefited them, but as many as 43% feel like losers. 30% are undecided. As we can see, the number of those who identify themselves as losers after 15 years of independence has grown.
The second difference is the reversed proportion of those who believe that Ukraine has actually become independent and those who have the opposite opinion. Last August, unlike August of 2004 or any previous year, 49% said that Ukraine had become independent and 37% said it had not. In his speech on the 14th anniversary of independence the President referred to this fact as testifying to the victory of democracy and freedom. Now, twelve months later, 35% of Ukrainians regard Ukraine as an independent country while as many as 52% believe that it is not. These returns are nearly the same as in 2001 (37% and 51% respectively).
It should be noted (as a weak consolation) that in Western Ukraine this balance is stably positive: 45% vs. 34%. But in the rest of the country it is negative: 43% vs. 48% in Central Ukraine, 27% vs. 57% in the Eastern regions and 24% vs. 68% in the South.
Last year’s positive balance could be explained partly by the outcome of the presidential race, in which the President was elected in defiance of external influences, and partly by high hopes: 76% of Ukrainians expected Viktor Yushchenko to strengthen the country’s independence. It should be reminded that 97% of Ukrainians also expected an “all-out fight against crime and corruption”, 78% expected the new leadership to “take action against oligarchs”, and 77% expected “more democracy in Ukraine”.
It was inspiring that these expectations were fully consonant with the President’s promises. He assured the people in no uncertain terms: “Until now we have only hoped for honesty. Now we are starting a massive attack on corruption. From now on, all officials will declare their incomes and expenses.”
But the vicious practice of understating incomes continues and the brass hats still say they are poor as church mice.
Not Quite a Holiday
The general attitude toward Independence Day as a holiday has not changed much: according to last year’s poll, it was really a big holiday to 22% of respondents. This year the figure is 20%. To 40% it was and remains an ordinary official holiday and to 30% – an ordinary day off. To 5% of Ukrainians it was neither a holiday nor even a day off. Now the number is 7%. This means that the people do not want to celebrate anniversaries of what they regard as virtual independence. But regardless of that, the announced three-day celebrations will take place. Day one is dedicated to the state flag. The President has asked all Ukrainians to hang out flags in every window. In response, some “irresponsible citizens” have suggested that the President hang out white flags in all his residences and offices.
Big parades, sport events, and flower exhibitions are expected in the capital city. The State Flag will be hoisted on Independence Square to an accompaniment of artillery salvoes. The ceremony will be followed by a relay race on the central streets, a concert of 32 brass bands, a folk performance for adults, and a dance party for youth.
On August 24, the President is going to pray for Ukraine in St. Sophia’s Cathedral together with the new Prime Minister and the new Verkhovna Rada Speaker. After the prayer, the President will congratulate the nation on the square in front of the cathedral. One may ask: why not on Independence Square where he spoke so convincingly last year about the glorious past and a bright future and promised a new tradition? After all, he has something to present to the nation on this anniversary – the National Unity Universal – a kind of reconciliation pact between Viktor Yushchenko and his inveterate opponent Viktor Yanukovych, which was advertised as an unpopular but strong decision and a triumph of wisdom. Perhaps it is because of this and other “triumphs” that the President is reluctant to appear on Independence Square.
Victory
I am convinced that we will win, because our positions are strong. This is no discredit of popular trust. This is no discredit of my honor and moral as the President who represents the new political leadership. We are convinced that the victory will be won by…
V. Yushchenko. March 24, 2006,
two days prior to parliamentary elections
In this phrase from Yushchenko’s interview, published on the presidential website, the most important word is missing – as if the journalist who left it out had foreseen the outcome.
It couldn’t have been different, because Yushchenko had lost long before election day, having discredited the people’s trust and his own presidential honor and morals.
First he signed a pact with Yanukovych, in which he promised to stop “persecuting the opposition”. He withdrew his signature later, but it was too late.
His defeat must have begun even earlier, when he ignored the law, arranging with the Prosecutor General (by phone) for the release of the arrested chairwoman of the Kozyn village council. She had been charged with abuse of authority. It was under her authority that the nouveau riche and other big shots began to build their luxury villas within the natural preserve area. Now this area is restricted and guarded from ordinary people. The President is not an ordinary citizen, but he doesn’t seem to care. Neither does he care that the banks of the Dnipro have been disfigured and irretrievably damaged by artificial alluviation.
His defeat must have begun when the government (with his consent or by his order) introduced a new income statement form, in which the column “other family members” was left out.
It must have begun with the dubious and utterly disadvantageous gas supply contract. Naftogaz President Oleksiy Ivchenko was sacked amidst a loud scandal about his exorbitantly expensive Mercedes (bought with taxpayers’ money), but on the next day Yushchenko hired him as his adviser. For several months, journalists hounded Yushchenko with questions about his own income but never got an explicit answer.
It must have begun with Anatoliy Kinakh’s shady deals with the Boryspil airport. Even when he was exposed, he stayed afloat in Yushchenko’s team.
It must have begun with unlawfully classified presidential decrees. Within the first hundred days of his presidency Yushchenko issued two scores of decrees and directives marked with “Not for Publication” and appointed dozens of people to executive posts, bypassing regular procedures.
Yushchenko announced a very ambitious and far-reaching program of reforms but made too many steps back. And yet, two days before the parliamentary election, he was sure that his political force would win.
Leonid Kuchma made grave mistakes, too. But he was forgiven many times because during his canvassing campaign he had only promised “radical economic reforms”. He had never promised that authorities would be “honest and transparent”. And he was honest enough, writing in his autobiographical book later that he had carried out “radical economic reforms in the interests of big business”.
Viktor Yanukovych has been and will be forgiven for many things as well. He likes to pray in public, but he never brags about his piety. His language is plain: “We’ll break their legs and then tear off their heads. And we’ll do it consciously, because we know who they are.” It is at least clear what one should expect from a man like him and there are no illusions.
Yushchenko came wearing white, with the Hagiography in one hand and a plan of the country’s moralization in the other. He came to power on the wave of the Orange Revolution and largely thanks to the people who trusted his patriotic words and promises of honest authority. But he had no moral right to do a single thing of those mentioned above or many other things that have never been mentioned.
He is earnestly for the nation’s unity. But he must and does know that there can be no unity without a trusted political leadership that has a positive image. Another prerequisite is constant dialog with the people. Regrettably, Yushchenko must have been deaf to the people if he was so sure about his victory in the 2006 election.
No Feedback
Early warning signs came in June of 2005 when the people began to tell their new leaders that things were taking the wrong turn.
In February, at the dawn of Yushchenko’s presidency, an unprecedented 54% of Ukrainians believed that everything was fine and only 23% said that something was going wrong. In June the number of optimists shrank to 43% and the number of pessimists grew to 31%.
In early 2006 the number of optimists dropped down to 18% while the number of pessimists soared to 62%. The proportion was even worse than in the last months of Kuchma’s presidency: in April 2004 it was 20% vs. 56%.
As a result, the institutions of power and the top officials responsible for the state of affairs in the country have been trusted less and less.
In February 2005 the President was fully supported by 47% of Ukrainians, the parliament – by 28%, and the government – by 36%. In January 2006 the figures dropped down to 19%, 7%, and 9% respectively. In April 2005 Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko, the main characters of the Orange Revolution, were trusted and supported by 49% and 47% of Ukrainians respectively. By January 2006 both had lost more than a half of their supporters and were trusted by only 21% and 19% respectively.
In other words, almost two-thirds of Ukrainians tried to tell their leaders what was really happening in the country, but the leaders turned a deaf ear.
The defeat was predictable. One may blame sociologists and even compare them to politicians. But they are communicators between the people and authorities – just like journalists or other watchdogs of democracy. And if authorities don’t hear the communicators, they are doomed in any democracy. It is only in this respect that the new leadership has proven to the world that democracy is present in Ukraine.
Victory 2
Look how paradoxical the Ukrainian elections are: 50% of people voted for one political force and 50% voted for another. How should the political leaders act? It’s no arithmetic – you can’t just cut everything in two. So I’ve told my colleagues many times: arithmetic doesn’t work here. We’ve got to become a little wiser. We’ve got to show that political leaders can offer a model that can really tie the two parts of Ukraine together.
V. Yushchenko. August 3, 2006
This is how Yushchenko tried to explain to the people why he had signed the pact with Yanukovych instead of dissolving the parliament.
Such was his final decision. But he should have made it four months earlier, right after the election returns were announced. He should have come out and told the people: “My dear voters, these are the ones you have elected. And as the president of the entire nation I am convinced that we need a coalition of the Our Ukraine and the Regions Party as the two most powerful representatives of the two halves of Ukraine. This coalition will abide by the Constitution and laws of this country and carry out the President’s action program. Yanukovych is a good guy and he will be a good prime minister. It’s agreed.”
Many would have felt insulted and indignant. But our people are not stupid. They would have understood. After all, they made the Orange Revolution for the right to choose freely, not just for Yushchenko’s presidency. Yanukovych would have had to resign himself to heading an “orange” government.
But Yushchenko was mute. For as long as four months the country lived watching the scuffle and waiting for fresh news from the political battle front. Finally, the country got a weird coalition of the pro-presidential Our Ukraine, the Regions Party led by Yanukovych, the Socialists, and the Communists (who had never even dreamed of such a gift).
The country got a document titled “The National Unity Universal” and a government with old familiar faces – almost all “new” ministers had once worked for Kuchma or Yanukovych. The only difficulty was the appointment of the Interior Minister. Representatives of the Regions Party hated to vote for Yuri Lutsenko, who had given them quite a headache. But they were persuaded by Rinat Akhmetov.
Now everything is fine. “No losers”, as the President said. But who is the winner? – The winner is Leonid Kuchma. We have seen Ukraine without Kuchma and it appears to be the same as it was with him. The winners are Kuchma’s “fosterlings” who felt safe and snug under Yushchenko’s wing. The winner is the system and moral of power created by Kuchma. Scientists describe adolescence as “a period of rapid and uneven development of the human organism characterized by intensive body growth, strengthening of the muscular system and ossification of the skeleton”. We have the intensively growing body and muscles. But we mustn’t let the skeleton built by Kuchma ossify. Otherwise this body will be that of a hunchback.
Yushchenko is really in a fix. He can’t appeal to the nation, knowing that he is no longer popular. There is no help coming from the west: the west of the country is too indignant and the West is too polite. There are no hopes for help from the east: the east of the country would hardly have the patience to listen to his ample preaching and the eastern neighbor would be only happy to preach and teach. And yet, he remains the guarantor of the Constitution and the Ukrainian people’s rights, whether he likes or hates the political reform. In the eyes of the international community he is not a pariah yet, but his image is next to ruined.
Two Banks of One River
I am sure that every person who holds the Ukrainian passport feels hurt and humiliated knowing that we are divided by some signs. We are a unique and beautiful nation with a colossally beautiful history. And if there emerges any challenge of any separation, a political leader must be the first to offer a solution.
V. Yushchenko. August 3, 2006
Yes, a political leader must act in this way. But in the most complicated and excessively politicized pre-election period this challenge was simply ignored. The President and his team had more than one year and more than enough powers to do something about the problems of Ukraine’s division. Yushchenko turned a blind eye to these problems, calling them “fetched”. He preferred to speak on behalf of the nation, divulging on what it did or didn’t need. He produced an impression of a man who identified himself as the leader of a certain nation of his own – unanimous and unified. But we are not at all alike.
The sociological service of the Razumkov Center has surveyed several characteristic features of Ukrainians’ self-identity in order to find out whether they feel as “one nation under God”.
The returns suggest three conclusions that are not totally unexpected.
First, we differ enough from one another and we are alien enough to one another.
Second, we are similar enough to happily share one country for a long time.
Third, we have big problems identifying ourselves as one nation.
As to the first conclusion, Yushchenko was wrong to state that the problems in question were fetched. As to the rest, he was hardly right to state that the national Unity Universal, Viktor Yanukovych, and the obscure coalition would reunite the nation.
Tell me where you live…
Our respondents were asked to identify themselves in terms of “place of residence – region of residence – Ukraine” as well as Soviet Union, Russia and Europe to indicate the degree of their ties with the cultural past (Soviet Union) and orientation for the major centers of attraction and irritation (Russia, Europe).
Local identity or affiliation with the place of residence, the small Motherland, was found to be most common. 44% of Ukrainians associate themselves with it. 31% affiliate themselves with the large Motherland – Ukraine as a whole, 15% - with the region of residence. Three out of one hundred relate themselves to the Soviet Union, two out of one hundred to Russia and one out of one hundred to Europe.
Local identity prevails throughout Ukraine except for the Western region, where 40% of the residents identify themselves with Ukraine. It is most prominent in the Center (50%) and in the South (49%). Apparently, this is due to Kyiv (which accounts for 17% of the population of the region) in the Center and Crimea in the South.
The degree of general Ukrainian identity declines as we proceed from the West to the East and to the South (from 40 % to 26%). The percentage of identification with Russia and Soviet Union grows the other way: from 0.3% identification with Russia in the West to 2.4% in the South and from 0.6% identification with the Soviet Union in the West to 4.2% in the South.
The degree of European identity neither grows nor decreases. In round figures, Europeans account for one out of one hundred in all regions!
Regional identity is most common to the residents of the East (19%) and least common in the Center (10%).
What does this mean? Nothing special, except for the fact that the residents of the Western Ukraine tend more to the big Motherland (Great Ukraine) than the other Ukrainians, who live and feel at home here.
What Language do you speak and why…
The majority (52%) of the citizens of Ukraine consider Ukrainian to be their native language, almost one third (31%) consider it to be Russian. Every sixth regards both languages as their native tongue, and every ninth has another native language.
Ukrainian as a native language dominates in the West and in the Center of Ukraine (90% and 72% appropriately), while in the East and in the South the majority of the population consider Russian their native language (54% and 52%) or is bilingual (24% and 17%).
This percentage reflects ethnic composition of the population in the regions: ethnic Ukrainians dominate in the first two regions (93% of the Ukrainians and 3% of the Russians in the West and correspondently 92% and 7% in the Center). They also make up the majority in the East and South, existing side by side with large ethnic groups of Russians (in the East, 67% are the Ukrainians and 30% are the Russians, while in the South they are 58% and 32% correspondently).
It is significant that people who speak Ukrainian fluently outnumber those who consider it to be their native language (58% and 52%). Considering those, who said that they have fair knowledge of Ukrainian, it turns out that 92% of the citizens of Ukraine either speak the state language fluently or have enough knowledge for communication. Only seven out of one hundred have problems with Ukrainian and only one out of one hundred said that he/she does not understand Ukrainian.
Clearly, the level of knowledge of Ukrainian declines from the West, where 89% speak it fluently, to the East and South, where 37% and 36% speak it fluently (71% in the Center).
However, much lesser people use Ukrainian in their everyday life, and in the East and South many fewer people use Ukrainian than consider it to be their native language. Ukrainian dominates in private lives of the residents of the Western region, where 89% of the citizens use exclusively or predominately Ukrainian; it also prevails in private lives of the residents of the Center (62%), but is of secondary importance in private lives of the residents of the East (16%) and South (21%), where Russian dominates (63% and 60% appropriately).
There are three reasons for the choice of the languages of communication: natural (“I have been speaking this language since childhood”), pragmatic (“this language is mostly spoken in the location where I live”) and moral (“this is the language of the people, to which I belong, the language of my state, it is my duty to speak this language, this is the language of the state, which I consider to be my Motherland”).
In all the regions the majority or relative majority of the people motivate their choice of the language by natural reason (47% in the West and 62% in the South). However, moral reason are peculiar to the Western region (43%), while in the center it accounts for 22%, in the East – 11% and in the South – 8%.
The answer to the following question demonstrates the degree of affiliation of the citizens of Ukraine with the Russian-language culture. When asked, “If you want to read a book by a foreign author, which translation of the book would you prefer –into the Russian language or into the Ukrainian language?”, 37% answered that they would prefer the Russian translation, 29% would prefer the Ukrainian translation and 28% - whatever translation they get first. Yet the residents of the West would prefer the Ukrainian translation (68%), of the Center – whatever they get first (40%), of the East and South – the Russian translation (68% and 58% appropriately).
What follows from this? First, for the residents of the Western Ukraine the Ukrainian language is more of a moral value, while for the residents of the Center, East and South it is rather a means of communication. Second, we have sufficient knowledge of the state language to use it as a means of international communication. Yet, the problem is that we also have sufficient knowledge of the Russian language…
To Which Culture Do You Belong …
Those surveyed were asked to identify themselves with the Ukrainian, Russian, Soviet or general European culture. The majority (56%) identified themselves with the Ukrainian culture, almost every sixth with the Soviet culture, and every ninth with the Russian culture. Almost seven out of one hundred identify themselves with the general European culture, which is seven times more than those who have identified themselves as Europeans in terms of place of residence.
Now let us make a few comparisons.
As we said, 31% relate themselves to Ukraine and 56% to Ukrainian culture; 2% relate themselves to Russia and 11% to Russian culture; 3% relate themselves to the Soviet Union and 16% to the Soviet culture; and finally, 1% relate themselves to Europe and 7% to the general European culture.
It is significant that more people relate themselves to the Ukrainian culture than consider Ukrainian their native language (56% and 52%) or use it in private life (46%).
Moreover, every fifth (20%) of those who relate themselves to the Ukrainian culture speaks the Russian language, while every fourth (25%) of the adherents of the Soviet culture speak Ukrainian. This means that widespread stereotypes that those who speak Russian are the enemies of Ukrainian culture or those who speak Ukrainian belong to the Ukrainian culture do not correspond to the reality. Certainly, there is a correlation between the language and cultural identity but it is not an absolute one.
As for prospects of the cultural traditions in Ukraine and its regions, those surveyed believe that in 20 – 25 years Ukrainian culture will prevail in Ukraine. Yet only 35% mentioned this tendency which is 21% less than those who currently identify themselves with the Ukrainian culture.
22% believe that different cultures will dominate in different regions, 16% spoke in favor of general European culture and only three of one hundred believe that Russian culture will dominate.
It is significant that belief in future domination of the Ukrainian culture was commonly expressed in the group of current adherents to the Soviet culture, while future prevalence of different cultures in different regions was supported in the group of adherents of the Russian culture. It is also significant that relative majority of the residents of the West and Center predict domination of the Ukrainian culture (45% and 47% correspondently), while residents of the East and South believe that different cultures will dominate in different regions.
On one hand, this could mean that population perceives current cultural differences between the regions as long-term, on the other hand, the residents of the East and South do not reveal an impulse to seek domination of their culture throughout Ukraine.
Yet there is also third side. As you remember, only 7% related themselves to the general European culture. However, when asked “Do you perceive yourself as a European?” 26% gave a positive answer (15% - unconditionally, 12% - rather yes). In other words, every fourth resident of Ukraine feels some association with Europe. The biggest number of the “Europeans” is in the West – 40%, while the smallest is in the East (18%). In the Center there are 25% and in the South – 30%.
It is sad that the low standard of living chiefly prevents Ukrainians from perceiving themselves as Europeans – 73% of those who do not perceive themselves as Europeans cited this reason. And only every tenth cites as the reason “I perceive myself as a representative of a different culture.”
In different research people were asked: “What should be the priority in the situation when there is a limited budget in Ukraine?” and proposed two possible answers: (1) state support to low income and disabled populations through the increase of financial assistance, subsidies, etc.; (2) state support to able-bodied citizens through the increase of salaries, creation of workplaces, support of small and medium businesses.
In December 2003, 64% of the polled chose the first variant and 33% the second, in October 2004 this correlation was 48% and 33%, while in December 2005 – 33% and 64%. Almost two thirds of the citizens prefer to receive jobs from the state but not financial assistance. This is a very European feature.
Then again, was it not for such European values as dignity, human rights, rule of law, political culture or the culture of political fight that people came out to the Maidan?
16% see the prospects for the general European culture in Ukraine. Is it much or little? This is almost every sixth person.
If we make a careful summary of the above we can assume that now Ukrainians have accepted Ukrainian culture and Ukrainian language to a different degree, which is however enough for a respectful attitude to it and at the same time they become more perceptive to the general European values and culture.
If we don’t associate Ukrainian language only with patriarchal and ethnographic aspects, if we produce quality literatures in the Ukrainian languages, translate feature films and cartoons for children, etc., the Ukrainian language will easily become a part of the private life and culture of the citizens of Ukraine. One more thing, we should avoid constant reforming of the Ukrainian language. After all, to ensure a single identity, a standard language, comprehensible to all, is needed.
Do you consider Ukraine your Motherland?
Yes. This was the answer of 93% of the polled, or of an overwhelming majority in all regions of Ukraine varying from 98% in the West to 82% in the South.
Yet this is only the perception of the Motherland as a country of residence, for only 70% of its citizens would have chosen Ukraine as their motherland if they had an opportunity to make such a choice. In the West and Center the overwhelming majority (79% and 76% correspondently) would have chosen Ukraine as their motherland, while in the East and South – simply majority (62% and 60%). Consequently, there are more of those who wouldn’t have made such a choice – 21% in the South and 18% in the East as compared with 7% in the West and 11% in the South.
This does not necessarily mean that Ukrainians do not like their country as a motherland. This means that Motherland is not merely a country, it is also a state. We have a somewhat different perception of what being a citizen of Ukraine means.
A relative majority (30%) believe that this means either an opportunity to feel concern of the government or to have proper social guarantees (24%) or a confidence that the Ukrainian government will protect its citizens if they appear in a difficult situation abroad (6%), which could be called a pragmatic attitude to the citizenship.
More than every fifth (22%) revealed a purely formal understanding of the state, having reduced it to the citizenship and Ukrainian passport.
At the same time, 20% base their attitude on values: for them citizenship means “feeling oneself a part of the single Ukrainian people, its culture and traditions.” The wish of 10% “to be proud of the achievements of our country and its representatives in different spheres – the economics, science, art, and sports” is very close to that.
Similarly, for every tenth, citizenship means a possibility to take part in the state affairs, to influence government (to elect the president, parliament and local governments, to take in referendums).
The attitude to the citizenship based on values is more typical to the residents of the West and Center revealed by the majority of the polled (36% and 24% correspondently). While in the East and South there are more of those who have a pragmatic attitude to the citizenship (32% and 33% correspondently).
So if the citizens have chiefly a pragmatic attitude to the state, one should not be surprised at the fact that they are not satisfied with it and are ready to give up this citizenship and the state. Do they feel the concern of the government with the due social guarantees? Are they sure that in case of a problem abroad their government will protect them?
That’s why they would have chosen a different Motherland. To take these words literally is the same as to take literally the words of a mother speaking to her teenage child.
Almost a half of Ukrainians (49%) would like to have a different citizenship, but only less than one fourth of this half are ready to give up Ukrainian citizenship for that. Only 18% of Ukrainians residing in the West, 20% in the Center, 26% in the East and 28% in the South would give up their Ukrainian citizenship.
Where would they go, having received a different citizenship? The residents of the West would mostly go to the USA (11%), Canada (6%) and Russian (5%). The residence of the Center, East and South would chiefly go to Russia (12%, 32% and 31% correspondently), as well as to the USA, Germany and Canada.
Do you consider yourself a patriot of your country?
75% answered “certainly yes” or “rather yes, but”. Their number has somewhat increased as compared to the year 2000, where there were only 71% of patriots. It is interesting that most significantly their number increased in the South of Ukraine, where in 2000 only one fourth of the population considered themselves patriots, while now they account for almost one third (32%). There were 36% of “rather patriots”, now they make up 43%. That is the degree of patriotism in the South makes up 75%, which is similar to that in the Center. However the highest degree of patriotism is still in the West (88%) and the lowest is in the East (64%).
The degree of readiness to protect Ukraine in case of a war is somewhat out of tune with the high level of patriotism. It has decreased from 66% to 53% for the period from 2000 to December 2005. This decrease is typical to all regions, except for the West, yet it is most significant in the East, were the degree of readiness to protect the state has dropped from 64% to 42%. This is the lowest percentage in Ukraine. Consequently the number of those who do not intend to protect their state has grown from 16% to 27% and is especially felt in the East (from 18% to 35%). It is quite possible that Ukrainians do not feel any threat of even a hypothetic war.
Yet the unwillingness of Ukrainians to provide assistance to their state in case of a financial crisis, similar to the citizens of the Southern Korea, who gave their jewelry including their wedding rings to the National Bank, is quite understandable. Only 6% would do so. At the same time the number of such citizens has grown from 3% to 16% in the West as compared to 2000. However overwhelming majority of the citizens would have refused to help the state in such case. The dominating reason of their refusal is unbelief that their valuables would be indeed used for the strengthening of the national currency, and not stolen.
To their credit there are no regional differences in the list of qualities which Ukrainians consider to be essential for a patriot. More than two thirds of the polled mentioned the following qualities (in descending order): labor for the sake of Ukraine, concern for the stable well-being of the family, the wish to bring up love of Ukraine in their children; respect for the law and governmental institutions; knowledge of the history and culture of Ukraine; aspiration to the equity of rights of all nationalities; readiness to struggle for civil rights and liberties, readiness to sacrifice ones’ life to protect Ukraine from enemies.
As compared with 2000, people mentioned more often such qualities as aspiration for the equity of the nationalities and much less the use of Ukrainian language in private life, public places and state institutions.
Such qualities as being against the rapprochement of Ukraine and Russia; belonging to the Ukrainian church; using of only Ukrainian language in private life, public places, and state institutions; being against the rapprochement with the USA; and being Ukrainian by origin are not important for a patriot (more than one third of the polled mentioned them as unimportant).
All of the above testify to a civil understanding of patriotism, which in fact is free from any ethnic accents, but which naturally requires love of Ukraine, knowledge of its history and culture and respect for its people. And there are no problems with the language.
Who do you feel akin to…
This section concerned the popular sentiment of social, cultural and psychological (emotional) kinship essential for the identification of the abovementioned “we” archetype. Respondents were asked to assess, on a scale of 1 through 10, the extent to which residents of other parts of Ukraine or neighbouring countries are close to them in terms of character, customs and traditions.
The outcome is stunning: by and large, Ukrainian nationals feel closer to Russians and Belarusians than to their countrymen and countrywomen from the West of Ukraine: Volyn, Halychyna, Bukovyna and Trans-Carpathians.
When broken up by regions, the picture looks like this:
· residents of Western Ukraine feel equally related to the people living in Poland and in Donbass;
· respondents from the Central regions feel closer to Russians than to their fellow citizens from Halychyna, Bukovyna and Trans-Carpathians;
· people in the East of Ukraine believe they have more in common with Russians than with Ukrainians living in the Crimea, other Southern regions and Kyiv; they feel closer to the residents of the two Eastern Slavic countries, Russia and Belarus, than to those of Volyn, Halychyna, Bukovyna and Trans-Carpathians;
· our compatriots in the South feel more connected with Russian citizens than with the residents of Slobozhanshchyna, Kyiv and the Center of Ukraine, and closer to the citizens of Russia and Belarus than to people from Volyn, Halychyna, Bukovyna and Trans-Carpathians.
Oblast-wise, the overall picture gets more specific and detailed:
· residents of Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast feel more akin to Poles than to Ukrainians in Donbass and the Crimea;
· respondents from Trans-Carpathian Oblast have more in common with the citizens of Hungary than of Donbass;
· inhabitants of Chernivtsi Oblast conceive of themselves as being more related to Moldavians and Romanians than to Donbass residents;
· residents of Donetsk Oblast and the Crimea feel closer to Russians than to Ukrainians from all other oblasts of Ukraine;
· respondents in Luhansk Oblast feel exactly the same, with the only exception for their Donbass neighbours, where people in Sevastopol make an exception to the Crimean residents.
Thus, the East is not too fond of the South, the South does not care much for the North and both dislike Kyiv. What brings the four together is their mistrust of the West, which, albeit more loyal to Ukraine per se, still appears ambivalent, if Poles or Donbass residents are their kindred spirits.
I cannot say who you are…
…At least, not right away.
Is it good or bad? Neither, it is just the situation as it is.
It was exactly the same 15 years ago, when we voted for the independence of the country that we considered our own and for the sovereignty of the state that we wanted to become ours.
We know why we are so different. We have no common history, religion and culture. Too long we lived in different empires, went to different churches, spoke different languages, had different values. More than once in history, we have fought with one another for the interests of those empires and, sometimes, of those churches. “Rus destroys Rus” is a recurring theme of Ukrainian history.
We do belong to different worlds: some remember the Austro-Hungarian emperors, others the Russian tsar, others still the Polish crown. Yet this is the reality of our today’s existence and we have to live with it.
Ukraine is not the only country to have striking regional differences. They are to be found in every part of the world where historical reasons exist, where the population is poly-ethnic and/or poly-confessional, where territories’ social and economic development is unbalanced and local communities have incompatible geo-cultural and geopolitical orientations.
Those differences, in and of themselves, do not jeopardize either the country’s territorial integrity or the cohesiveness of the civil nation. The risk becomes imminent when these differences accumulate and concentrate regionally, growing into contradictions.
Ukraine has all of the above types of differences, in their most dangerous combination and with clear geographical localization. That they are pregnant with conflict is evident from the fact that anything, from poly-ethnicity of the population to the time zone, can spark a social argument. What time do you use to celebrate the New Year? Some use Kyiv time, others use Moscow time. It is a potentially sensitive issue. Viewed as a cultural tradition or historical memory of those who remember the tsar, it contributes to the forming of “they” archetype, but perceived as a political demonstration, it brings in the notion of “aliens”.
Unfortunately, as stated above, we lack common history and, therefore, vital nation-forming factors like a common historical myth, image, and hero.
For people in the Western oblasts, “Ukraine is the only successor to the history and culture of Kievan Rus” (46%), while for the rest of Ukrainians “Ukrainian history is inseparable from that of a great Slavic nation, as well as the history of Russia and Belarus” (East – 54%, Center – 42%, South – 60%).
People in Western oblasts, regard the war with the Nazis as World War II (41%), while the rest of Ukrainians perceive it as the Great Patriotic War (East and South – 64% each, Center – 59%).
Notwithstanding the differences, we love our country, we call it our Motherland, we are patriotic enough and as patriots we believe we can contribute to its well-being by working hard, by teaching children to love their country, by knowing its history and culture. We speak Ukrainian. We want to be proud of our land, to respect its laws and public institutions. This is what most of us feel like, according to the survey results.
Now we can say, or at least suggest, who we are: we are the people willing to become a civil nation.
But are we too alien to one another to live in one indivisible country?
Aliens
Of course, there are many reasons for us to feel divided. Inter-regional economic ties are severed. The Soviet-style disproportions in the region’s economic development have not been ironed out over the last 15 years. On the contrary, they have intensified. In the West, industry has collapsed, while in the East the “large national capital” has been built up as a result of President Kuchma’s “economic reforms”. One telling example will suffice to illustrate the regional economic discrepancies. In 2005, export capacity of Ukrainian regions (calculated per capita) was as follows: USD 281 in the West, USD 1295 in the East (i.e. five times as large), USD 594 in the Center, and USD 360 in the South.
The West and Center of the country have always been agrarian, while the East and South – industrial. Hence the difference in the ration of rural and urban population: In the West it is 53% to 47%, in the East – 16% to 84%, in the Center – 39% to 63%, and in the South – 34% to 66%.
This, in turn, leads to disparity in employment and inequality in earnings: in 2005, average monthly salary in Ternopil Oblast was 2.4 times as low as in Kyiv, whereas unemployment was 15 times as high.
That is why residents of the Western oblasts join the hordes of labour migrants to Europe and other remote countries, while those of the Eastern and Southern oblasts seek better employment opportunities in Russia.
Inter-regional economic cooperation is almost non-existent. Industry in the East and South heavily depends on supplies, especially the supply of power, from Russia and works predominantly with Russian partners. In other regions, industrial enterprises cooperate with neighbouring oblasts or countries.
And again, the situation has not changed since the disintegration of the USSR 15 years ago.
We are still deprived of geographic mobility, or, put in plain language, we cannot travel freely throughout the country, meet and talk to one another. For one thing, it is too expensive for the majority of the population. For another, there is no residential housing market in place to stimulate and support internal labour migration. Nor are there sufficient vocational training opportunities for young people. In 2005, the volume of inter-city passenger traffic was half the volume of 1990; over this period of time, passenger traffic by rail reduced by 1.5 times, by river – decreased fivefold, and by road – dwindled fourfold.
We still have no decent roads. You will remember that Roman roads created the Roman Empire. Over the last 15 years, the total mileage of transport routes decreased, with the only exception of motorways, the length of which grew by 1%.
The same is true for most sectors of the national economy and most spheres of social life, ranging from the tourism and hotel business to a bizarre policy of “bringing higher education facilities to the young people’s places of residence”.
What we have, in the final analysis, is alienation: we do not know one another; therefore we have difficulty understanding one another or sharing one another’s values.
Helping us to find common interests and attitudes, to bridge the gap in developmental needs and capacities should be a top priority for politicians who care for this country.
My nation
Our countrymen and countrywomen have a differing understanding of the Ukrainian nation:
· 43% of the surveyed believe it encompasses “all citizens of Ukraine irrespective of their ethnic origin, language they speak, national traditions they practice and teach their children to follow”;
· 34% of respondents consider ethnic origin to be the key criterion of belonging to the Ukrainian nation, 14% of these consider the Ukrainian nation to refer to all ethnic Ukrainians regardless of their place of residence and citizenship;
· 15% of respondents think citizenship of Ukraine, rather than ethnic origin, is the leading criterion, but they emphasize the need to speak Ukrainian, observe Ukrainian traditions and pass them over to the younger generations.
The ratio is 43% to 49%, within the sampling error, which, if extrapolated onto the living tissue of the society could loom large, since it affects values, feelings, identities and other sensitive matters.
So we have two options to choose from: either we try to impose values on one another and run the risk of further alienation, or we negotiate and agree to live in peace as people willing to become a civil nation.
To start with
What does it take to live in peace with one’s neighbours? Not much, in fact: trying not to flood with water those who live on the lower floor, keeping your cat away from the neighbours’ doorstep, avoiding loud rows (at least after 11 PM), trying not to choke the garbage chute. It is easy.
The situation becomes more complicated when the neighbours celebrate Easter on a different day, call it “Passover” and eat matzoth instead of Easter cake; or vice versa, when they eat Easter cake instead of matzoth. Examples are plenty. And all we have to do is respect the neighbours’ living space including, along with the place where they dwell, their customs and traditions, preferences and many other things collectively referred to as “culture”.
Of course, we will never become a family, celebrate our holydays and sing folk songs together with eyes full of happy tears, just because we have different folk songs. This is not expected of us – we are neighbours, not relatives (who usually do not even live next door, by the way).
The same rule applies to living in one country: citizens of the same state are not relatives, but they are compatriots. Happy and proud tears should well in their eyes when they watch fireworks on Independence Day, see their national flag go up on the flagpole, hear the national anthem, analyze the President’s (or the Cabinet’s) State of the Union speech and think of their common heritage and their common ownership.
In this context, ownership is not about material wealth alone, which has been so shamelessly appropriated by a handful of clans. It is about the ownership of the country whose citizens we are. According to the survey data, 16% of Ukrainians feel this country belongs to them (not bad, given that the real “kings of the castle” are never surveyed). However, the overwhelming majority of respondents (76%) have no feeling of ownership whatsoever.
It is also about people’s desire to live in this country and belief in their social prospects, or chances for self-accomplishment: only 19% of Ukrainian citizens think they have social prospects in this country, while 69% are absolutely pessimistic on this score.
At the dawn of this administration, in February 2005, 36% of Ukrainians were confident of their social prospects; at the nadir of the previous regime, in July 2004, optimists were few (17%), just like today.
On the eve of the 15th anniversary of Ukraine’s independence, most of its citizens see their country as a “European state of little consequence, in search of its place on the international arena”. One should not blame them for the lack of loyalty and devotion. As a nation-to-be, we (all of us, in all regions) hope that Ukraine will soon become a “highly developed, powerful and influential democratic European state” because, and I will repeat it emphatically, we want to be proud of our country. Every other Ukrainian needs this feeling of pride in their country (as much as one needs prosperity) to be happy. What do we want to be proud of? The vast majority of Ukrainians, with no regional variations, wish they could be proud of high living standards (74%) and advanced level of economic development (71%).
Alas, we cannot boast it today but we are, nonetheless, willing to hang out national flags on Independence Day, without any encouragement from the President. And we know how the country should move to where we want to see it.
First, Ukraine should ensure the rule of law, fair and universal in application. Only then will we become a single nation, unified by equal protection by the law and equal rights, rather than by ethnic origin.
Second, Ukraine should gradually change the situation whereby a poor person is doomed to lifetime poverty; whereby nine individuals out of ten are sure they will never go from the category of respondents who “in general, earn enough for everyday life but not for purchasing durable goods”, to the category of those who “have a good income but cannot afford an apartment, a car and the like”. “Never” here does not imply eternity: ten years is enough. If a person knows that ten years of hard work will not buy him/her, say, an automobile, it is as bad and hopeless as “never”, no matter how old the person is.
Third, Ukraine should, finally, get an administration that would live by the law, rather than dictate laws to the people. It should serve the people, not itself. It should be willing to live in a law-respecting state and work towards it, rather than pay it lip service for 15 years.
And then we will be united. “Ukraine”, “Motherland”, “country, “state”, “nation” (perhaps, even “public institutions”) will merge in our mind into a unified notion. We will learn to respect and treasure them, as patriots should.
And we will be proud of our country. There will be no need for the officials to call upon us to hang out the national flags from our windows: we will do it ourselves like millions of people in Denmark, Sweden, the USA, Germany, Finland, Portugal and a host of other unitary and federal states, monarchies and republics, presidential and parliamentary.
Yet it is up to us to get the Ukrainian State and the public authorities to respect the rule of law. Nobody else can do it. The Pact of National Unity and other agreements between Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych cannot do it. Nor can the two men themselves. We know their capacities and limitations. They have both been Prime Ministers before. One of them has even been the President.
Liudmyla SHANGINA
The article relies on the findings of the Razumkov Center survey carried out in all regions of Ukraine on the following dates: December 20-27, 2005 (2,009 persons surveyed, sampling error being 2.3%); April 20 - May 12, 2006 (11,216 persons surveyed, sampling error being 1%); July 13-20, 2006 (2,011 persons surveyed with the sampling error of 2.3%). All respondents were over 18 years of age.
